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I. Introduction
In contemporary public policy debates, there are two key challenges to the present system of social organization: a desire for private
sector provision of many of the services delivered by government, and

a desire to remove the federal government from state and local affairs.' These challenges are represented, respectively, by the potent
ideologies of Libertarianism 2 and New Federalism. 3 The cumulative

1. The central idea is that "nobody believes anymore that government delivers."
Sanoff, Nobody Believes Any More That Government Delivers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 21, 1981, at 74-75 (interview with Peter F. Drucker, Clarke Professor of
Social Science, Claremont Graduate School, California) [hereinafter cited as Sanoff].
2. As described in THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO, Libertarianism centers on the
absolute inviolability of person and property. It identifies the state as the chief
aggressor against these basic rights. It seeks to thwart this through subjecting the
state to the moral code applicable to individual actors. In other words, "regardless of
popular sanction, War is Mass Murder, Conscription is Slavery, and Taxation is
Robbery." In the context of this Article, the libertarian position is to oppose any
government actions, such as regulations or subsidies that interfere with private
property or the free market economy. M. ROTHBARD, FoR A NEW LIBERTY, THE
LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO 24-25 (rev. ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ROTHBARD]. in
fact, "[t]he ultimate libertarian program may be summed up in one phrase: the
abolition of the public sector, the conversion of all operations and services performed
by the government into activities performed voluntarily by the private-enterprise
economy." Id. at 200. See also Judis, Libertarianism: Where the Left Meets the
Right, PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1980, at 36-38 [hereinafter cited as Judis]; The New
Libertarians:Stripping Government of its Powers, SAT. REV., Mar. 1980, at 21-24.
3. The most recent proposal to earn the label "New Federalism" is President
Reagan's concept of assigning responsibility for a number of federal programs to state
and local governments in connection with federal relinquishment of various revenue
sources. 128 CONG. REc. H51, H54 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1982) (State of the UnionAddress). It is motivated by a desire to have the programs be more responsive to their
clients and financiers, to strengthen the flexibility of state and local governments,
and generally to end the perceived "distortion in the vital functions of government."
Id. This proposal is merely one specific programmatic initiative in the Reagan
Administration's efforts to reduce simultaneously the federal and general governmental roles in American life. The merits of this wide-ranging policy thrust are the
subject of contentious debate. See, e.g., Why the New Federalism May Never Be,
Bus. WK., Feb. 8, 1982, at 27; Issues in a New Federalism, NAT'L CIVIC REV., Mar.
1982, at 126; Kinsley, The Withering Away of the States, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar.
28, 1981, at 17; "New Federalism," Old Rap, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 28; Next:
State v. State?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 12, 1982, at 76; Are the States Ready
for New Federalism?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1982, at 54.
It should be noted that "New Federalism" also refers to the programs of the Nixon
Administration centering around the general revenue sharing plan adopted as the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 918
(1972). In this vein, the term means "the replacement of federal categorical programs
by relatively discretionary grants to state and local governments." Pressman, Political
Implications of the New Federalism, in FINANCING THE NEW FEDERALISM 13 (W.
Oates ed. 1975).
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effect of these forces is to reject the current federal role in social
ordering. One means of critically analyzing this concept is to examine
the development and character of the federal role in particular areas
of social affairs. The purpose of this Article is to highlight lessons that
may be learned from the area of labor protection in urban mass
transit.
Public transportation is quite relevant to the issues of federal influence on local public service delivery, because the local transit industry
is presently governed by the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMT
Act). 4 This federal statute is representative of Washington's approach
to public service delivery problems. Part II of this Article traces the
development of federal intervention in the urban mass transit industry. The history of public transportation as an economic sector illustrates the problems of market and governmental failure that motivate
and support the involvement of the federal government in this area of
service delivery. The mode of involvement-the UMT Act-simultaneously provides badly needed financial assistance and imposes conditions on its receipt. Many of these conditions are extraneous to the
policy goals represented by the fiscal redistribution. A particularly
striking example is the guarantee of labor protection embodied by
section 13(c) of the UMT Act.
The evolution of section 13(c) elucidates one manner in which
extraneous conditions on federal financial assistance arise. Part III
reviews labor relations in urban mass transit and the policy of federal
labor protection. It also examines section 13(c), the law's impact on
the industry, and its federalism and publicism 5 implications. This
discussion raises various institutional questions that are reflected in
recent judicial activity. The cases and their antecedents illustrate the
problems of the mode of social ordering represented by section 13(c).
The rapid rise of governmental, particularly federal, involvement
in public transportation 6 and the resulting complications have moti-

4. Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
5. The word "publicism" is coined here to refer to the relationship between the
public and private sectors and the study of the role of each in our social system, just
as "federalism" relates to these aspects of the central government's interaction with
other levels of government. "Public" is used synonomously with "government." See
also infra notes 238-58 and accompanying text. But see Friedman, Some Pet Peeves,
NEwswEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, at 58.
6. Kilgour, The Impact of Section 13(c) of the UMTA on Labor-Management
Relations at BART, 10 TrtANsP. L.J. 289, 290 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kilgour].
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vated the development of alternative models of social ordering. Part
IV considers these models. A simultaneous development has been a
shift in political power toward those espousing theories of Libertarianism and New Federalism. Part IV also reviews federal governmental
activities relating to mass transit labor protection in light of this
change.
The dynamic context of an industry which has undergone extensive
evolutionary change and of proposals aimed at prompting further
changes requires an examination of the theoretical foundations that
create the parameters for social ordering. This is the purpose of Part
V. Part VI applies these concepts to urban mass transit and relates
them to the new models that have been presented. Although it is
impossible in this forum to provide answers to the questions of the
proper federal or other role in social ordering, even in one particular
industrial sector, it is possible to delineate the area within which
debate and intelligent solutions must lie.
In the legal context, it is important to recognize and develop the
role that the judiciary will have in these policy debates and their
products. The courts are significantly involved in the issues underlying
the federal role in social ordering, and they will continue to be. Part
VII addresses this judicial role. It criticizes the current trend of case
law and sets forth an alternative framework for future endeavor.

II. Intervention in Urban Mass Transit
A. Historical Perspective
1. Market and Governmental Failures
a. Technological Developments
Urban mass transit began in the 1820's and 1830's in the form of
horsedrawn omnibuses and street railways. In the mid-nineteenth

During the consideration of the UMT Act, one estimate was that ninety-five percent
of transit operations in the United States were privately owned and operated as late
as 1963. H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2569, 2590. By 1967, only ten percent of transit systems
were publicly owned, but sixty percent of total operating revenue and sixty-two
percent of passenger trips were in public systems. Figures for 1978 indicated fortyeight percent of the systems were under public ownership, and these represented
approximately ninety percent of revenues and trips. AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT AssoCIATION, TRANSIT FACT BOOK 38-39 (1978-79 ed.) [hereinafter cited as TRANSIT FACT
BOOK].
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century, steam locomotives and cable cars competed with the horsedrawn modes. Eventually, electric traction systems replaced these
modes. Rapid transit lines were built in New York, Chicago, Boston,
Philadelphia and Cleveland. By 1917, gasoline-powered motor vehicles in the form of five-to-seven passenger jitneys were an important
element, and later motorbuses became common. The advent of the
internal combustion engine also led to the emergence of the automobile and the present, predominantly private, urban transportation
system .7
b. Structural Developments Within the Industry
The old street railway companies were private entities that operated on a single thoroughfare,8 under a franchise of the state or
municipal government.9 As the industry converted from animal-labor
to centrally-provided forms of locomotion, each city's transit companies consolidated and expanded.' 0 Although economically efficient, this
created an industry characterized by the market failure situation of
natural monopoly. I I Though the franchising system allowed for regulation, governmental efforts to control the industry were largely ineffectual, and fares and other public concerns were regulated through
free market competition. 2 In response to the monopoly problem engendered by consolidation, many jurisdictions attempted to increase
public influence. This led to a chaotic arrangement in which the
transit company and the municipality interacted in an atmosphere of
perpetual conflict. 13 Therefore, although mass transportation was
7. C.

BURKE, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE CASE OF PERSONAL RAPID

TRANSIT 45-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BURKE]; E. SCHMIDT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION 3-21, 23-24 (1937) [hereinafter cited as SCHMIDT].
8. G. SMERK, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION: A DOZEN YEARS OF FEDERAL POLICY
135 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SMERK].
9. SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 52.
10. Id. at 36-38. Some companies were also consolidated into multi-city conglomerates. Id. at 38-39.
11. SMERK, supra note 8, at 135. Market failure here refers to occasions when the
private market of free competition fails to achieve an efficient outcome. Efficiency in
economic theory means a situation in which no person's position may improve
without diminishing that of another. It is also known as "Pareto Optimality." See R.
LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 235 (6th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LIPSEY &
STEINER]; N. BARRETT, THE THEORY OF MICROECONOMIC POLICY 42-53 (1974) (identifies four incidences of market failure: failure to achieve equilibrium, monopoly,
externalities and public goods) [hereinafter cited as BARRETT].
12. SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 36, 55.
13. Id. at 55-62; see K. JENNINGS, J. SMITH & E. TRAYNHAM, LABOR RELATIONS
IN A PUBLIC SERVICE INDUSTRY:

UNIONS, MANAGEMENT,

AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN

MASS TRANSIT 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM]; SMERK,
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largely a private sector activity,14 the structure of the market encouraged significant public involvement.
During World War I, many companies went bankrupt. The industry never fully recovered.' 5 After a brief resurgence during World
War II, the industry declined precipitously. 1 6 The cause of this is a
subject of debate. 17 It is clear, however, that postwar urban America

supra note 8, at 138; Yago, Urban Transportation in the Eighties, in WINTER 1983
DEMOCRACY 43, 44 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Yago].
A key source of both control and conflict was the prescription of fixed fares and
levels of service. Even though there was greater flexibility in more "modern" regulatory devices such as terminable permits and service-at-cost franchises, public entities
remained involved in the workings of these privately-owned and operated enterprises. See SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 55-62; Wickham, Section 13(c) Labor Protective
Agreements and Paratransit:Rethinking Labor Department Policy, 27 U. KAN. L.
REV. 63, 65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Wickham].
14. Many of the early transit company franchises permitted public assumption of
ownership, but few street railways were taken over by governmental units. Subway
construction, with its higher costs and risks, had more public involvement, yet
private companies remained in control. See SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 64. The first
cities to assume full ownership of their mass transit system were Seattle in 1919 and
Detroit in 1922. Id. at 63, 69.
15. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 57, 60; SCHMIDT, supra note 9, at 44.
16. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 60; SMFRK, supra note 8, at 138. Transit ridership
reached a peak of 23.3 billion in 1945 and then fell rapidly to a low of 6.6 billion in
1972. TRANSIT FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 26.
17. BURKE, supra note 7, at 57. One conspiratorial argument states that the oil,
automobile and rubber companies destroyed the urban transit industry. E.g., Snell,
American Ground Transportation: A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile,
Truck, Bus, and Rail Industries, in The IndustrialReorganization Act: Hearings on
S. 1167 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
Part 4A (1974); Kwitny, The Great TransportationConspiracy, HARPER'S MAG., Feb.
1981, at 13; Yago, supra note 14, at 45-46; cf. St. Clair, The Motorization and
Decline of Urban Public Transit, 1935-1950, 41 J. OF ECON. HIST. 579 (Sept. 1981)
(economic analysis of thesis that motor buses were part of an organized campaign to
eliminate public transit). But see Burke, The Myths of Mass Transit, USA Today,
July 1982, at 25, 26.
Another fault-based theory is that mass transit declined because of the improper
pricing structures, arising from governmental funding decisions, of public and private modes. See L. FITCH & ASSOCIATES, URBAN TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
22-24 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FITCH]. On the other hand, Meyer, Kain and Wohl
advance the view that transit's troubles are due to the market's rationally responding
to new land use patterns (for which the automobile was not primarily responsible) by
turning away from the inappropriate and inadequate transit systems in favor of the
car. See J. MEYER, J. KAIN & M. WOHL, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 36062 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MEYER, KAIN & WOHL]. Underlying all of these ideas
are the internal problems of the public transit industry that handicapped it in
adapting to change; the industry was long subject to financial speculation, corruption, over-capitalization, and lack of innovation. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 7, at
50-51, 62; FITCH, supra, at 44; SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 30-34; Yago, supra note 13,
at 44.
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consisted of decentralized metropolises spread over large geographic
areas."8 This type of community is ill-suited for public transit modes,
and the individualized transport provided by the automobile became
essential to many Americans. 9 Attempts by transit companies to
adapt to the changed environment entailed major financial costs; 20 at
the same time, ridership and fare revenues declined. 2 1 To curb these

The federal government played a key role in the decline of transit. In the early
1930's, most of the street railway companies were part of power company trusts.
Scandals in these conglomerates led to enactment of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). In the divestiture aftermath of this law, the power companies disposed of their unprofitable transit operations and public transit lost the financial support of the trusts. BURKE, supra note 7, at
58; Saltzman, The Decline of Transit, in PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 34-35 (G. Gray & L. Hoel ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Saltzman, The Decline of Transit]; SMERK, supra note 8, at 136-37. New holding
companies emerged to take control of these weak firms. The largest was National
City Lines. General Motors and other auto-related companies used National City
Lines to convert public transit to motor bus systems. BURKE, supra note 7, at 57;
Saltzman, The Decline of Transit, supra, at 35-36; SMERK, supra note 8, at 137; see
FITCH, supra, at 46. The federal government succeeded in dismantling National City
Lines in an antitrust action, see United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d
562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951), and another source of capital was
lost. BURKE, supra note 7, at 59; Saltzman, The Decline of Transit, supra, at 36, 38.
This occurred at the same time as federal housing (Veterans' Administration and
Federal Housing Administration loans) and transportation (the Interstate Highway
System) programs were promoting urban decentralization. See, e.g., FITCH, supra,
at 48; J. MEYER & J. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, AUTOS, TRANSIT AND CITIES 5, 7-9 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ]; Saltzman, The Decline of Transit,
supra, at 37-38.
It is instructive that federal intervention in disparate areas can exert so much
influence that it unilaterally distorts a variety of other social systems. The result is
that many of the economic and political failures that motivate and justify federal
intervention may be federally caused.
18. MEYER & GOMEz-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 15-20; MEYER, KAIN & WOHL,
supra note 17, at 36-62. See H. GOLDEN, URBANIZATION AND CITIES 302-07, 315, 32223 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GOLDEN].
19. "In Levittown the automobile is the dominant, perhaps the only, means of
transportation to work and the individual's main link to the outside world." GOLDEN,
supra note 18, at 474. See M. DANIELSON, FEDERAL-METROPOLITAN POLITICS AND THE
COMMUTER CRISIS 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as DANIELSON]; MEYER & GOMEZIBANEZ, supra note 17, at 51-56; OWEN, TRANSPORTATION FOR CITIES 5-6 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as OWEN].
20. For example, in 1955, the Urban Traffic and Transportation Board for the
City of Philadelphia estimated that $65 million to $80 million would be needed to
adequately modernize mass transit within the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
SMERK, supra note 8, at 24.
21. After the 1945 peak of 23.3 billion, ridership fell to 17.3 billion in 1950, 11.5
billion in 1955, and 9.4 billion in 1960. TRANSIT FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 26. In
constant 1945 dollars, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1978 at 401 (1979), revenue fell from $1.38 billion
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increasing deficits, service frequency and quality were reduced and
fares were raised. However, this only accelerated patronage losses,
and a destructive cycle emerged. Urban mass transit collapsed as a
22
private endeavor.
23
This postwar collapse evidenced a new situation of market failure.
The inadequacies of the private sector forced local government to
assume responsibility for maintaining transportation services. The systems were thoroughly urban phenomena,2 4 and as such were widely
regarded as local problems. 25 However, the financial resources of
cities were not coequal with their new responsibilities. 26 Jurisdictional
constraints meant an inadequate revenue base for subsidizing opera-

in 1945 to $1.19 billion in 1955, and to $.92 billion by 1960. See TRANSIT

FACT BOOK,

supra note 6, at 20.
22. Yago, supra note 13, at 46. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 59; Saltzman, The
Decline of Transit, supra note 17, at 32-34.
23. There are two main elements to this market failure. Many persons-often
referred to as public transit "captives" or "transportation disadvantaged"-are inadequately served by the private market, auto-dominated transportation system, and
require some type of government intervention. An additional motivation is that the
transportation disadvantaged are often the targets for income redistribution programs. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FINANCING TRANSIT: ALTERNATIVES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 34, 255-57 (1979); MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra
note 17, at 230-53; Saltzman, Providingfor the TransportationDisadvantaged, in
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 563-70 (G.
Gray & L. Hoel ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Saltzman, TransportationDisadvantaged]. The second market failure element has classic externalities and "public good"
characteristics. In terms of the problems underlying governmental assistance for
urban mass transit, the automobile imposes costs that are not included in the price of
its use, and public transit has social benefits that are not fully realized in a faresupported financing arrangement. See, e.g., FITCH, supra note 17, at 111-18; MEYER
& GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 14, 155, 177-79, 206-08; OWEN, supra note 19, at
33-34; M. PIKARSKY & D. CHRISTENSEN, URBAN TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 163-64 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN]. The early
assistance program arising from the UMT Act had the production of these coordinate
external benefits of public transit as its primary goal. Hilton, The Urban Mass

TransportationAssistance Program, in PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION
POLICY 133 (J. Miller III ed. 1975); cf. A. ALTSCHULER, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM: POLITICS AND POLICY INNOVATION 31-36 (1979) (shift of attitude at federal
level from regarding urban mass transit as localized, dying industry to seeing it as
means of solving urban problems) [hereinafter cited as ALTSCHULER].

24. See DANIELSON, supra note 19, at 9.
25. Id. at 24.
26. CONCRESSIONAL

BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION: OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE]; MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 41; see DANIELSON, supra

note 19, at 100.
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tions. 27 Major capital expenditure needs-to upgrade existing systems
after years of industrial decline and to adjust service to conform with
new patterns of geographic distribution- exceeded the cities' financial
capacity. 28 They therefore sought the necessary financing from the
29
federal government.
2. Federal Intervention
A significant catalyzing event for proponents of federal aid was
passage of the Transportation Act of 1958.30 This Act was intended to
3
aid the position of the railroads in relation to other transport modes. '
One measure employed to achieve this goal was the allowance of2
3
expedited approval of withdrawal of interstate passenger service.
Immediately after passage, cities served by commuter railroads, especially those in the New York metropolitan area, faced the threatened
withdrawal of a large portion of transit service. 33 This crisis galvanized urban interests. 34 The advocates of federal aid for urban mass
transit used the crisis as a stimulus in their efforts to build a coalition
35
of support, achieving their ultimate success in 1964.

27. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 26, at 2; see DANIELSON, supra
note 19, at 93.
28. See FITCH, supra.note 17, at 55-57.
29. See DANIELSON, supra note 19, at 93-94. State government, generally dominated by rural interests, had no desire to make what was perceived to be an income
redistribution to the cities. See id. at 76; SMERK, supra note 8, at 32-34.
30. Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 5, 72 Stat. 568 (1958) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1501, 10524, 10526, 10704, 10908-09, 11501 (Supp. V 1981)). See inJra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
31. DANIELSON, supra note 19, at 28.
32. Id. at 35, 38. This provision now appears at 49 U.S.C §§ 10908, 10909 (Supp.
V 1981).

33. See

DANIELSON,

supra note 19, at 47-52.

34. This does not mean that the crisis motivated a coherent or unified blueprint
for action: "From the outset, differing perceptions of the problem, and the varied
capabilities for action rooted in the fragmented institutional base, prompted responses designed to serve the interests of particular jurisdictions rather than the area
as a whole. Consequently, no single plan emerged from the crisis." Id. at 52.
Danielson identifies three important attempted responses, each advanced by a different political constituency: governmental financial aid aimed at preserving commuter
rail service (state (New York)), modification of the statutory changes made by the
1958 Act (suburbs), and federal mass transit assistance (central cities). Id. at 52, 55.
35. Id. (detailed examination of drive for federal aid for mass transit that ensued
after the Transportation Act of 1958); see also SMERK, supra note 8, at 26-40 (shorter
version of story of 1958 law and its aftermath, drawing heavily on Danielson's work).
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B. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964
The major direct federal intervention in urban mass transit is the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.36 Initially, this legislation
provided funds through a capital grant program to state and local
governments for their use in revitalizing the industry. Congress recognized that just as some systems had already been taken over by public
entities, the capital funds might be put to that purpose. 37 More importantly, however, Congress sought to provide the capital needed for
modernization, extension and rehabilitation. 38 Operating expenses
were left to the private sector and the cities, in accord with the
prevailing view that mass transit was a local problem and that a
39
general subsidy would encourage waste.
C. Conditions on Monetary Assistance in the UMT Act

1. Generally
Monetary assistance provided by the UMT Act is accompanied by a
variety of conditions. The requirements for recipients of federal mon-

36. Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The first direct intervention was the authorization of a
capital loan and demonstration project program in the Housing Act of 1961. See Pub.
L. No. 87-70, § 501, 75 Stat. 149, 173 (1961). The authorization was small, however,
and the program was generally unattractive. MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17,
at 43.
37. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. H14968-70 (1964) (statement of Rep. Gill); S. REP.
No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1963).
38. MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 43. See also Urban Mass Transportation-1963: Hearings on S. 6 and S. 917 Before a Subcomm. on Housing of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1963) (statement of Sen. Williams) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate Hearings].
39. MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 43. The idea that the bill would
not oust the private sector from the urban mass transit industry pervades the legislative history. See 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 312 (statement of Sen.
Williams); S. REP. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963) ("The committee believes
that there are only a few cases where existing private companies will be acquired
....
It is not the intent of this legislation to promote public ownership of urban
transportation systems . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963),
reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2569, 2583; 110 CONG. REC. 1490304, 14906-07, 14968-71 (1964) (statements of Reps. O'Neill, Rains and Gill, respectively); 109 CONG. REC. 5320, 5370 (1963). Of course, what has actually occurred is a
substantial use of federal funds to acquire private companies and convert local

governments into direct providers. See G.

HILTON, FEDERAL TRANSIT SUBSIDIES: THE

52-53 (1974). Federal involvement has broadened since 1964. The most significant change was the enactment of
operating subsidies in 1974. National Mass Transit Assistance Act of 1974, PuB. L.
URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
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ies include: no discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, sex or age; 40 use of metropolitan planning organizations
for urban areas; 41 reduced fares for elderly and handicapped persons
during off-peak hours; 42 provision for relocation of anyone displaced
by a project; 43 public notice and hearings on all projects, and consideration of economic and social effects, environmental impact, and
consistency with comprehensive development plans; 44 no changes in
fares and no substantial changes in service without public hearings
and consideration of public viewpoints, effect on energy conservation,
and economic, environmental and social impacts; 45 making all contracts not competitively bid subject to federal audit; 46 paying prevailing wage rates on all federally funded construction projects; 47 and
making arrangements to assure that the position of any worker is not
48
worsened as a result of federal aid.
Most of these requirements are not intimately related to the substantive content of the grant-in-aid program. 49 They represent extraneous policy goals. 50 These conditions, and their counterparts in other
federal interventions, constitute an important and intriguing source of
51
federal power and influence.

No. 93-503, § 103, 88 Stat. 1565, 1567 (1974) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976).

41. Id. § 1607(b) (Supp. V 1981).

42. Id. § 1604(m) (1976).

43. Id. § 1606.
44. Id. §§ 1602(d), 1610.
45. Id. § 1604(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
46. Id. § 1608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
47. Id. § 1609(a) (1976).
48. Id. § 1609(c).
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. "The federal presence in public transit over the past two decades has ...
evolved from pre-1964 minimal participation, to a federal transit program ...
where other federal agencies are viewing transit as a means of attaining goals other
than the mobility-related objectives usually associated with transit investment."
Hemily & Meyer, The Future of Urban Public Transportation: The Problems and
Opportunitiesof a Changing FederalRole, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 287, 289 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hemily & Meyer]; accord ALTSCHULER, supra note 23, at 31-36.
51. Another important area of federal influence not under consideration here is
the provision of program guidelines and criteria by federal agencies to grant recipients. These can often turn into de facto regulations that bind localities to a national
standard unresponsive to varying conditions. See PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN, supra
note 23, at 117 (example of federal equipment guidelines that lead to federal direction of local contract process by becoming specifications).
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231

2. Section 13(c): Guarantee of Labor Protection
The extraneous condition central to this discussion is the labor
protection effected by section 13(c). 5 2 It provides that no aid may be
given under the UMT Act unless "fair and equitable arrangements"53
are made to "protect the interests of employees affected" by that aid.
The Secretary of Labor determines the fairness and equity of the
arrangements, 54 and at minimum, these arrangements must implement the section's specific guarantees.
Section 13(c) specifically provides for five guarantees. Any rights to
collectively bargain 5 must continue. Additionally, all rights, privi-

52. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976).
It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 1602 of this title that
fair and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary
of Labor, to protect the interests of employees affected by such assistance.
Such protective arrangements shall include, without being limited to, such
provisions as may be necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges,
and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under
existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass
transportation systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such
arrangements shall include provisions protecting individual employees
against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment
which shall in no event provide benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of this title. The contract for the granting of any such
assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of the protective arrangements.
Id. This provision was enacted in 1964 as § 10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation
Act, see 110 CONC. REC. 14,987 (1964), and it had been § 19(c) in the Senate version.
See 109 CONG. REC. 5688 (1963). It was renumbered as § 13(c) in 1966. Pub. L. No.
89-562, 80 Stat. 715 (1966). For clarity and consistency, all references will be to the
commonly used § 13(c).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976). See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
54. Other than the fairly specific parameters set out in the section's five specific
guarantees, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, there is no definition of
"fair and equitable" in either the statute or the legislative history. The courts have
interpreted it to be within the discretion of the Secretary of Labor. See Kendler v.
Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209,
1218-23 (M.D. Ga. 1977); cf. Congress of Ry. Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68
(D.D.C. 1971) (finding limited judicial reviewability, if any, of Secretary of Labor's
determination of "fair and equitable arrangements," in context of similar statutory
language and Amtrak's labor agreements).
55. "Collective bargaining" refers to the "negotiation, drafting, administration
and interpretation of written agreements between employers and unions representing
their employees setting forth their joint understanding as to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment." R. SMITH, L. MERFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD,
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leges and benefits under existent collective bargaining agreements
must be preserved. Workers must be protected against a worsening of
their employment positions. These protections cannot be less than
those provided by section 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act 5 6 for
railroad employees involved in mergers, acquisitions and consolidations. 57 Employees affected by acquisitions must be given assurances
of employment, and laid-off or terminated workers must be given
reemployment priority. Finally, paid training or retraining programs
must exist. 58 The terms and conditions of the section 13(c) arrangement are included in the grant contract between the Department of
Transportation and the recipient.

AND LABOR ARBITRATION 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
& ROTHSCHILD].
56. 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (Supp. V 1981).
57. The evolution of labor protection standards for railroads is well summarized
in New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979), a case upholding
an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) order establishing a general set of conditions as satisfying the statutory directive. See also JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM,
supra note 13, at 131-34. The seminal protection arrangement was the Washington
Job Protection Agreement of 1936. Id. at 86. It protected employees involved in
consolidations, mergers and similar operations changes by requiring the negotiation
of transition agreements, the payment of certain compensatory amounts, and the
submission of disputes to binding arbitration. Id. at 86-87. The ICC eventually
developed the so-called "New Orleans conditions." New Orleans Union Passenger
Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271 (1952). These conditions continued the requirements
for payment of such items as displacement expenses and dismissal allowances, with
both four and five-year protective periods. Notice, negotiation and compulsory arbitration requirements were later explicitly included. Southern Ry. Co. Control-Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 331 I.C.C. 151 (1967). When the Amtrak system was created in
1970, a labor protection guarantee referent to § 5(2)(f) (and similar in language to §
13(c)) was included. See 45 U.S.C. § 565 (1972). The Secretary of Labor subsequently certified a labor protection agreement embodying what are now known as
the "Amtrak conditions." These conditions increase the benefits provided by the New
Orleans conditions by increasing the basic protective period to six years, allowing for
upward adjustments in payments due to wage increases, and shifting the burden of
proof regarding adverse effect to require proof of absence of effect by the employer.
See Congress of Ry. Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68, 75-76 (D.D.C. 1971). A
1976 amendment to § 5(2)(f) included these conditions as a floor to the section's
protections. See Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 403(b)(2), 90 Stat. 31, 65.
58. These guarantees address the two situations which the section's proponents
and creators were contemplating: takeover of private companies by governmental
bodies and automation. See D. BARNUM, FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC: LABOR RELATIONS
IN URBAN MASS TRANSIT 152 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BARNUM]; Wickham, supra
note 13, at 69; see also infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
SMITH,

MERFIELD
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III. Labor Protection in Urban Mass Transit
A. Historical Perspective 59
1. Labor Relations Priorto Federal Intervention
A predicate to understanding section 13(c) is a comprehension of
the history of the urban mass transit industry's labor relations. Labor
unions have long been a fixture of the mass transit industry, but labor/
management relations have never been typical. 60 As public utilities,
transit firms were subject to regular intrusions from the local political
machinery. This discouraged an open system of employer/employee
countervailing powers synthesizing into negotiated compromises. Disagreements were limited to a range within which they could be settled
without outside involvement. The supreme economic weaponry of
strikes and lockouts was either unavailable or available only at high
costs such as loss of political support, a decrease in ridership, and the
encouragement of increased governmental intervention leading to a
net worsening of conditions. Additionally, the regulated fare structure
sharply curtailed the realistic outcomes of wage and benefit negotiations. These factors all contributed to the presence of binding arbitration as a key feature of the industry's labor relations.
Increasing management dissatisfaction with the results of voluntary
arbitration and the general decline of the industry in the immediate
postwar period eroded the symbiotic, insular employer/employee rela2
tionship. 61 Strikes, which had been rare, began to occur more often.

59. This section draws heavily on

BARNUM,

supra note 58, at 48-69. Historical

material is also found throughout JENNINCS,
J.

STERN, R.

URBAN

MILLER,

TRANSIT

S.

RUBENFELD,

(1977) [hereinafter

SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, and
C. OLSON, & B. HESHIZER, LABOR RELATIONS IN
cited as STERN & MILLER]. See also SCHMIDT,

supra note 7.

60.
[T]ransit labor relations have always been and continue to be somewhat
atypical of both private and public-sector union-management relationships. Included among its distinguishing characteristics are a political
involvement in bargaining which predates public ownership, an established bargaining relationship whose private-sector roots often extend back
forty or more years, an industry tradition of voluntary arbitration of
interest disputes, and a legal environment which in most cases is somewhat
more restrictive than is found in the private sector and, at the same time,
more liberal than that which applies to other groups of public employees.
STERN & MILLER, supra note 59, at 173-74.
61. It must be noted that despite this erosion and ensuing events, a large degree
of insularity remains, as does the preference of both labor and management to retain
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Many states passed strike control laws on the ground that transportation was a vital public service. 3 These laws normally provided for
compulsory interest arbitration. 4 The Amalgamated Transit Union
was successful in invalidating these in 1951 .65 Having been eligible for
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) structure
since 1944,66 transit employees acquired rights similar to the rights of
employees in private industries. Arbitration fell and strikes rose as a
method of impasse resolution.6 7 By the late 1950's, the workers possessed impressive legal rights.68 To preserve their positions, the unions
joined other proponents of federal aid in seeking financial assistance
for their ailing employers.
2. Labor Influence in Intervention
a. 1962 Hearings
The AFL-CIO expressed its support of federal intervention at the
1962 hearings for the predecessor bills to the UMT Act.6 9 However,

it. See JENNINGS, SMITH &
supra note 59, at 34, 39.

62. See

BARNUM,

TRAYNHAM,

supra note 13, at 35, 37;

STERN & MILLER,

supra note 58, at 70.

63. Id. at 60, 63, 67.
64. See, e.g., 1947 Wis. Laws eh. 414 (Wis. Stat. §§ 111.55-111.59 (1947)).
65. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am.,
Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). The Supreme Court held that the federal labor laws preempted state regulation of peaceful
strikes, even in relation to local public utilities or "public emergencies." Id. at 38996.
The Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), which changed its name from the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of
America in 1963, was founded in 1892. It is the dominant union in the industry. It
was the prime force behind the use of voluntary arbitration in mass transit. The other
major union, the Transit Workers Union (TWU), has its main strength in New York
and Philadelphia, and it has tended to be more militant. BARNUM, supra note 58, at
14-23, 50-54. The evolution of the ATU is examined in STERN & MILLER, supra note
59, at 108-31.
66. See NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 795 (1944). Since 1958, the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over all private
transit systems within the jurisdiction of the federal labor statutes that have a gross
volume of business of at least $250,000 a year. See Charleston Transit Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 1296 (1959).

67. BARNUM, supra note 58, at 70.
68. Cf. C. SUMMERS & R. RABIN, THE RIGHTS OF

UNION MEMBERS

(1979) (Ameri-

can Civil Liberties Union guide to rights of persons involved in unions within
National Labor Relations Act framework).
69. Urban Mass TransportationAct of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 11158 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d
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the union emphasized that any legislative action aiding public utilities
should include language protecting workers' rights to union representation, collective bargaining, and grievance and dispute resolution
procedures. It drew Congressional attention to the "scandalous" and
"disgraceful" situation in Dade County, Florida, where workers
were
striking over the denial of these rights by system management after
public assumption of ownership.70 The union's representative stressed
the importance of private sector involvement or other mechanisms to
prevent a recurrence of the Florida debacle. 71 The 1962 transit bill
died in the House Rules Committee. 72 The absence of labor protective
language may have contributed to the bill's demise by diluting labor's
73
support.
b. The UMT Act
i. Initial Proposals
When the bill that eventually became the UMT Act was introduced
in 1963, labor's concerns were represented in its proposals.74 The
problem for the unions was the likelihood that revitalization of the
industry through federal assistance would result in greater public
ownership. The continuing strike in Dade County and the perception
that the practices employed there were spreading 75 convinced union

Sess. 420-24 (1962) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller) [hereinafter cited as 1962
House Hearings]; Urban Mass Transportation-1962:Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13 (1962)
(statement of Andrew J. Biemiller) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearings]; cf.
1962 House Hearings, supra, at 219-21; 1962 Senate Hearings, supra, at 161 (statement of George M. Harrison, representing Railway Labor Executives' Association)
(expressing support for proposed legislation and speaking generally to labor relations

issues).
70. See 1962 House Hearings, supra note 69.
71. Id.

72. SMERK, supra note 8, at 54.
73. See STERN & MILLER, supra note 59, at 117.

74. In his introductory speech, Senator Williams stated that he had solicited the
views of what is now the ATU on specific language for the protection of workers from
the ill effects of federal aid. See 109 CONG. REC. 217 (1963); See 1963 Senate
Hearings,supra note 37, at 21 (letter from President Kennedy proposing urban mass
transit legislation).
75. Union workers also lost bargaining rights in Dallas, San Antonio and Nashville. Urban Mass Transportationof 1963: Hearings on H.R. 3881 Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 490 (1963) (statement of
Andrew J. Biemiller) [hereinafter cited as 1963 House Hearings]; Nolan, Public
Employee Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C. L. REV. 235,
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leaders that federal protection was essential if the rights that had been
impressively garnered were to be retained. 7 The transit unions faced
a dilemmatic choice between industrial collapse and public ownership.
A week before the congressional hearings began, the AFL-CIO
executive council adopted a resolution calling for the inclusion in any
transit legislation of a provision requiring "fair and equitable arrangements" for the protection of workers' rights. 77 At the hearings their
representative testified that they would actively oppose the bill if such
a provision were not included. 8
Immediately preceding this testimony, Secretary of Labor Wirtz
presented the respective committees with a Kennedy administration
proposal for protecting workers' rights. 7 The union representatives
supported the spirit of the Wirtz proposal, but they requested more
specific and certain guarantees. A few days later, they presented their
own version. 80 Committee members expressed concern that the labor
proposal exceeded reasonable bounds. They felt it created conflicts
with state policies and could motivate strong opposition leading to
defeat of the larger bill.8" The Wirtz proposal was substantially ac-

251 n.78 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nolan]. See generally ATU, Local Div. 1338 v.
Dallas Pub. Transit Bd., 430 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 838 (1969); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees of Am., 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
76. See, e.g., 1963 House Hearings, supra note 75, at 319 (statement of Andrew
H. Biemiller); id. at 325 (statement of Bernard Cushman). Most states prohibited any
union representation, collective bargaining, or other labor activity by public employees. While most previous public takeovers had been accompanied by specific language in the enabling legislation ensuring continuation of workers' rights, see, e.g.,
1959 Pa. Laws 1266, Pub. L. No. 1266, § 13.2; 1947 Mass. Acts ch. 544, §§ 18, 19;
see also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 326 (statement of Bernard
Cushman); 1962 House Hearings, supra note 69, at 423-24 (statement of Andrew H.
Biemiller), there was little assurance that anti-labor states (such as Florida) would be
so accommodating. Additionally, the political power labor had in pro-union areas
could not so easily be translated into legislative concessions if substantial unconditional federal aid were available.
77. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 318 (statement of Andrew Biemiller).
78. Id. at 322. The Railway Labor Executives' Association concurred, explicitly
reversing their position of the previous year. Id. at 380 (statement of George E.
Leighty).
79. Id. at 308; 1963 House Hearings, supra note 75, at 476.
80. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 322-23; 1963 House Hearings, supra
note 75, at 494-95. For the, Administration's comparison of the differences between
its proposal and labor's proposal, see 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 482-83.
81. See 1963 House Hearings, supra note 75, at 633-44.
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and included in the bills which
cepted by the respective committees
82
were reported out favorably.
ii. Floor Debate
A significant amount of floor debate on the urban mass transit aid
bills centered on the labor protection issue. Opponents charged that
the concept practically mandated featherbedding. 83 They were
equally concerned that the particular language constituted a federal
usurpation of state and local governments' employment prerogatives
by overriding laws prohibiting public employee strikes and collective
bargaining.8 4 However, amendments to disallow any protective ar85
rangements inconsistent with state law were defeated in each house.
The purpose of the labor protection section, as expressed by the bills'
sponsors, was not to override state law. Its purpose, rather, was to
ensure that federal monies were not used to strip transit workers of
their rights and benefits and to warrant that automation and other
technological modernizations prompted by the aid would not have a
harmful effect on workers. The stated motivation thus centered on
issues of justice and equity. 8
iii. Labor's Effectiveness
The importance of labor support for mass transit legislation8 7 is
evidenced by the progressive strengthening of the language of section

82. See S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. Rep. No. 204, 88th
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2569.

Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
83. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 14,903 (1964); 109

CONG. REC.

5676, 5677 (1963).

"Featherbedding" refers to "employee practices which create or spread employment
by unnecessarily maintaining or increasing the number of employees used, or the

amount of time consumed, to work on a particular job."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

549 (5th ed. 1979).

84. See, e.g., 110

CONG. REC.

14,903, 14,977 (1964); 109

CONG.

REc. 5322, 5415

(1963).

85. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,980 (1964); 109 CONG. REC. 5422, 5582 (1963). This
language had been included in the version approved in subcommittee in the Senate.
See 109 CONG. REC. 5423 (1963). The bills' sponsors advocated rejecting these amendments on the ground that they were superfluous and would establish a precedent that
might lead to the finding of negative implications in the future. Additionally, the
sponsors opined that an override of state laws would be unconstitutional anyway. See
110 CONG. REC. 14,980 (1964); 109 CONG. REC. 5417, 5422 (1963).
86. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 14,976-77 (1964); 109 CONG. REC. 5417, 5670-72
(1963).
87. The final vote for passage in the House was 212-189. 110 CONG. REC. 14,987
(1964).
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13(c) as it moved through the floor debates. 8s The final product
resembled more closely the unions' "radical" proposal than the administration's amendment. Final authority over the adequacy of the protection provided was given to the Secretary of Labor. 89 The five
specific categories of protection9 0 were made less discretionary. 9' The
guarantee of collective bargaining rights was strengthened from "encouragement of continuation" to "continuation ,' 92 and section
5(2)(f)'s financial protections were inserted as a floor for the labor
protection arrangements.9 3 Finally, the complete arrangements certified by the Secretary of Labor were required to be placed in the grant
contract.9 4 The enactment of these extensive protections was a demonstration of labor's effective use of political power in the environment
95
that produced the federal aid measure.
B. Section 13(c): Operational Impact
The effects of section 13(c) implementation on the urban mass
transit industry's operations are the subject of heated and confused
debate." Those opposing section 13(c) argue that the efficient operation of the system has suffered from the preoccupation with preserving

88. The only explicit reference in the floor debates to the need to enact labor
protection in order to secure the support of the unions was by Senator Morse,
speaking of the railroad brotherhoods and their demands for reference to the protections of § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 109 CONC. REC. 5676 (1963).
Senator Tower then attacked this language as a capitulation to the unions in exchange for their backing. Id. at 5679.
89. Pub. L. No. 88-365, § 10(c), 78 Stat. 307 (1964).
90. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
91. Pub. L. No. 88-365, § 10(c), 87 Stat. 307 (1964).
92. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
93. Pub. L. No. 88-365, § 10(c), 78 Stat. 307 (1964).
94. Id.
95. Cf. Kilgour, supra note 6, at 306 (section 13(c) reflects labor's political power
rather than reasoned policy). But see PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 1011 (section 13(c) is the result of national full employment policy, not unions'
strength).
96. Compare, e.g., Transit Assistance Act of of 1982: Hearings on S. 2367 and S.
2377 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 353-62 (1982) (statement of John
Rowland, International President, ATU) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Senate Hearings]
with The Financial and Productivity Problems of Urban Public Transportation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm.
on Public Works and Transportation,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 379-83 (1981) (statement
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employee rights.17 In fact, the foremost consideration in the debates
over section 13(c) is the law's financial impact. Opponents of the
provision argue that protecting workers from ill effects of federal aid
locks operators into the inefficient pattern of work rules, wage and
benefit scales, and service levels that originally necessitated intervention.9 8 Innovation is stifled because savings in labor costs due to system
improvements cannot be realized in the environment of section
13(c). 9 Also, the presence of unions in public sector enterprises, where
the governmental employer is unable to engage in arm's length negotiations like its private counterpart is viewed as giving labor an unfair
advantage. This leads to excessive wages, luxurious benefits packages,
and a system generally more concerned with workers' financial gain
than service delivery.100 Supporters of section 13(c) respond to these

of Arthur E. Teele, Jr., Administrator, UMTA) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House
Hearings].
97. For an extensive analysis of the costs of section 13(c), see F. Siskind & E.
Stromsdorfer, The Economic Cost Impact of the Labor Protection Provisions of
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (Report to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, May 1978), which finds inconclusive evidence. See
also 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 87-107 (General Accounting Office
study); BARNUM, supra note 58, at 152-57; JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra
note 13, at 142, 186; STERN & MILLER, supra note 59, at 102, 266; Kilgour, supra note
6; Lowenstein, The Need for Limitations on Federal Mass Transit Operating Subsidies: The Chicago Example, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 265, 272-73, 283 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Lowenstein]; Peirce & Hamilton, infra note 263, at 1,636; Verbit, The
Urban TransportationProblem, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 368, 416-17 (1975). The most
instructive observation about the operational effects of § 13(c) is that everyone
involved has evidence no more convincing than simple apprehensions. STERN &
MILLER, supra note 39, at 65.
98. See, e.g., Transit Assistance Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1160 Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 140-48 (1981) (statement of Ray
Mundy) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Hearings]; 1981 House Hearings, supra
note 96, at 40 (statement of Alan Altschuler); BARNUM, supra note 58, at 152; cf.
Resolution of the Board of Directors, Am. Pub. Transit Ass'n (Oct. 11, 1981),
reprinted in 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 289, 290 (section 13(c)'s encouragement of arbitration, with the standards used in it, ignores industry's present
character and status).
99. See, e.g., 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 96-97 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart); 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 128 (statement of Ray
Mundy); 1981 House Hearings, supra note 96, at 383 (statement of Arthur E. Teele);
PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 8, 9; Curtis, Section 13(c) Reconsidered:
Is Federal Labor Protection Still Necessary for Mass Transit, 33 LAB. L.J. 622, 627
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Curtis]; Lowenstein, supra note 97, at 273.
100. See, e.g., 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 90-99 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart); id. at 108-13 (statement of John Charles Houston); Kilgour, supra
note 6, at 306-08; Lowenstein, supra note 97, at 282-83.
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criticisms by focusing on the inconclusive evidence and questionable
motives of their exponents.' 0'
A second major source of dispute is the existence of union veto
power, 01 2 and the particular manner in which section 13(c) is administered. For most transit employees, protective arrangements are the
product of negotiations between the local management and the union.
The Secretary of Labor certifies the arrangements as "fair and equitable" within the meaning of the statute.10 3 This process, it is argued,
gives labor the ability to impose conditions upon acceptance because
management must obtain the concurrence of the unions in a section
13(c) agreement before a grant application is approved. The underlying assumption is that a wide range of concessions on wage, benefit,
work rule and other demands are obtained in this manner, thus
imposing greater costs. Additionally, the delay incurred in negotia04
tions increases project costs and postpones necessary improvements. 1

101. See, e.g., 1982 Senate Hearings,supra note 96, at 353-62 (statement of John
Rowland).
102. See, e.g., id. at 92 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart); 1981 House Hearings,
supra note 96, at 37 (statement of Alan Altschuler).
103. 29 C.F.R. § 215.3 (1982). See also infra note 136 and accompanying text.
Although this was not the subject of formal regulations until 1978, see 43 Fed. Reg.
13,558, 13,560 (1978), it has always been the Department of Labor's practice, see
JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, at 140; Wickham, supra note 13, at
64, 70, 71, and was in fact anticipated by Congress, S. REP. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2564, 2584-85. It must be noted, however, that the
flexibility and variability normally to be expected from this type of arrangement is
curtailed by the Department's practice of referring applications to the international
office of the union(s) involved. See 43 Fed. Reg. 13,558 (1978). This administrative
practice has also changed internal union relationships. See STERN & MILLER, supra
note 59, at 119.
104. See Wickham, supra note 13, at 73-74, 76. But see JENNINGS, SMITH &
TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, at 142, 186; STERN & MILLER, supra note 59, at 99-100,
107 (surveys indicating no significant use of section 13(c) as a blackmail tool); cf.
BARNUM, supra note 58, at 151 (unions' good results regarding § 13(c) due not to veto
power but rather to unpreparedness of management). A related concern is the
possibility that § 13(c) may discourage potential applicants for federal aid. See
JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, at 186. Compare 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 150 (statement of Clarence Pendleton, Jr.)(section 13(c) and
other federal requirements led new San Diego Transit provider to forego federal aid)
with 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 360 (statement of John Rowland) (statements regarding San Diego federal aid decision are self-serving speculation). See
generally Sood, Going it Alone: Why One Small Operator Bought Buses Without
Federal Aid, Fall 1979 TRANSIT J. 15 (1979)(rejection of federal aid because of
attached conditions).
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Hence, opponents of section 13(c) lament the vivid shift in focus from
an emphasis on service to a concentration on labor. 0 5
C. Section 13(c): Institutional Questions
Congress attempted to rescue urban public transportation with the
UMT Act. The means by which this was to become operational posed
a conflict between two policy judgments previously enacted in the
National Labor Relations Act: (1) the exemption for state and local
governments from the statute's coverage; 10 6 and (2) the programmatic
goals of protecting workers' rights, promoting economic democracy
and ensuring industrial peace. 0 7 Section 13(c) represents the determination of precedence.10 8 The restraint of the federalism judgment,
protecting state and local government prerogative, was set aside. Of
course, section 13(c) does not involve the compulsion that would have
been present with an assertion of commerce clause or other direct
Nonetheless, its attachment to an assistance measure passed
power. i0'

105. This is a common complaint. See, e.g., N.
GOVERNANCE

OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE:

[hereinafter cited as HAMILTON &

A

HAMILTON

STUDY OF URBAN

HAMILTON].

& P. HAMILTON,
34 (1981)

MASS TRANSIT

Many of the operational concerns

with § 13(c) may largely be problems of perspective. The attention given to workers'
concerns by § 13(c) is undeniably significant. Although our system generally operates
to protect everyone from direct harm as a result of public action, C. SCHULTZE, THE
PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 70-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SCHULTZE], it is
unusual for this protection to take such an explicit and unyielding form. It seems
fairly unremarkable, however, that in the same legislation there are protections for
the owners of private transit companies and other businesses. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1602(e),
(f), (g), 1607(e) (1976). A broader conception of equity would see attention to
workers' rights as fully legitimate and would mandate protections for employees. Cf.
110 CONG. REC. 14,976 (1964) (equity requires protecting workers as much as owners
of private transit companies). The negative impact this would have on profits (or
alternative measures of fiscal performance) would be as acceptable as any other
necessary cost. This idea is relatively unfamiliar in our system, however, and a
provision like § 13(c) is facilely vilified as abnormal, irrational, or wrong.
106. "'The term 'employer'... shall not include ... any State or political subdivision thereof ...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
107. See id. § 151.
108. This extension of the protection of federal labor law concepts to an area
where they were previously not applied does create new rights and enhance old ones,
contrary to language in Division 580, ATU v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth.,
556 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1977).
109. The Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), relied on a variety of assertions in the plaintiffs' complaint relating to the
effects of the direct assertion of commerce clause power represented by the extension
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local governments: the costs of fire
protection in Cape Girardeau, Missouri would double; one California community
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at the request of the eventual recipients" ° necessarily led to a replacement of the policy prerogatives of these governments.
1. Direct Conflict with Existent State Law
The congressional debate over section 13(c) centered on the interfacing of inconsistent federal and state law. Although numerous statements were made regarding the precedence of state law, there was
equivocation on the issues of whether inconsistent state laws would
have an effect on the availability of funds or would be otherwise
affected by administration of the protective language."' Senator
Javits made the most direct and detailed statement of the provision's
design:
[W]hat it does, by not mentioning the proposition, is to enable the
Secretary of Labor and the Housing Administrator [now Administrator, UMTA], to go into a State where a right-to-work law or
some other law deprives the municipal employees-that is, employees of the transit system-of collective bargaining rights. Perhaps because the Administrator has money to give out, some States
may be induced to make some accommodation on that score by the
necessary exemption from the law ....

had to terminate its affirmative action program and another its program for college
interns; the California Highway Patrol cut its training program in half; Arizona
estimated an overall added cost of $2.5 million; and California estimated an increase
of between $8 million and $16 million. Id. at 846-47. The Court also noted that the
federal imposition would abrogate local authority to employ teenagers for less than
the minimum wage and would compel a complete restructuring of police and fire
personnel scheduling because of overtime restrictions. Id. at 848, 850.
110. The chief pressure for federal intervention in mass transit came from large

metropolitan areas. See

DANIELSON,

supra note 19, at 178;

FITCH,

supra note 17, at

227.
111. The following exchange was referred to by both proponents, 109 CONc. REC.
5418 (1963), and opponents, 109 CONG. REC. 5415 (1963), of § 13(c) during the floor
debates:
Senator Tower: Mr. Secretary, would this amendment supercede State
laws that prohibit public employees from striking?
Secretary [of Labor] Wirtz: I think ... that there could be no superceding of State laws by a provision of this kind. That is the assumption on
which we are proceeding.
Senator Tower: [I]n my State it is prohibited by law for public employees to strike. And this would not affect that?
Secretary Wirtz: When you say "not affect" it, that would be a somewhat broader question. Surely on the question of superceding-I say
"surely"; to the best of my knowledge-that is true. Now, whether there
would be an effect I think is a somewhat different question.
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Therefore, we have a balanced scheme. We do not override the
law; at the same time, we do not compel the Federal Government
to go in where the law is adverse to the interest of labor ...and

perhaps also even give encouragement to exempt a situation of112this
kind where the State desires to give this type of Federal help.
Congress made no explicit decision on the extent of the power of the
policy it enacted. The apparent assumption was that the Department
of Labor would be able to use a combination of financial enticement
and flexible arrangements to achieve the objectives of both this particular provision and the larger interventionist program. 113
a. Flexible Arrangements
The idea of flexible arrangements centered on what is known as the
"Memphis formula." To save public transportation service in 1960,
that city bought the privately owned transit system. The management
of the private company was retained to operate the new Memphis
Transit Authority. This arrangement was motivated both by administrative concerns and by a desire to maintain the existing system of
labor relations and benefit plans. All workers were made employees of
the management corporation, which handled personnel and labor
relations. All fares were the property of the city, and these revenues
were used to reimburse the private company for the costs of operation. 114
The Memphis formula exemplifies contract-management service
delivery, an important concept in public administration."l 5 For Con-

1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 312.
The centrality of the right to strike is representative. The obvious congressional
concern, the inflammatory nature of public employee strikes, and the history of the
industry led to a focus, in the administration of § 13(c), on the broader concept of
impasse resolution procedures, with arbitration being the most commonly used. See
BARNUM, supra note 58, at 81.
112. 109 CONG. REC. 5422 (1963).
113. Accommodating inconsistent federal and state or local policies is provided for
in the Department of Labor's formal regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 215.3(a)(2) (1982).
114. J. STERN, R. MILLER, S. RUBENFELD, C. OLSON & B. HESHIZER, THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE URBAN TRANSIT INDUSTRY 11-24
(1976) [hereinafter cited as STERN & MILLER-LEGAL FRAMEWORK]. The Memphis
Transit Authority assumed direct control of the transit system in 1973 when the
creators of the hybrid relationship retired or left and their successors were unable to
keep the arrangement working. Id. at 24.
115. For an overview of contract-management service delivery and the general
"contracting-out" phenomenon from a variety of perspectives, see Cowden, California Local Government ContractingAfter Proposition13, 4 INT'L. J. OF PUB. AD. 395
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gress in 1964, it provided a solution to a potential dilemma. Both
labor representatives testifying before the committees and proponents
of the bills speaking on the floor referred to the Memphis arrangement
as a desirable way to preserve collective bargaining and other rights in
publicly-owned systems when a state law against public employee
collective bargaining existed and no special legislation could be obtained.""
There was passage of special legislation, however. As some states
had done for internal political reasons prior to 1964,117 legislatures
included union representation, collective bargaining, and impasse resolution procedures in the enabling acts for public mass transit systems.
Many of these laws include the exact (or similarly stated) guarantees
of section 13(c).11 8 Others authorize transit services to "take all actions
necessary" to meet the requirements of the UMT Act and administra-

(1982); Fisk, Issues in ContractingforPublic Servicesfrom the Private Sector, MGMT.
INFO. SEav. REP., May 1982, at 1; Florestano, Contracting with the Private Sector,
71 NAT'L Civic REV. 350 (1982); La Mirada: A City with a Different View, GOV'T
ExEc., May 1981, at 47; Hughes, ContractingServices in Phoenix, PuB. MGMT., Oct.
1982, at 2; Lowery, The Political Incentives of Government Contracting, 63 Soc.
Sci. Q. 517 (1982); Shulman, Alternative Approaches for Delivering Public Services,
URB. DATA SEv. REP., Oct. 1982, at 2-3; Why Cities Farm Out Work to Private
Firms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1980, at 65. The relatively institutionalized use of contract-management in urban mass transit, under the Memphis formula,
is reviewed briefly in HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 108-09; JENNINGS,
SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, at 26-28. For an overview of the present state of
contract-management in the urban mass transit industry, see HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 108-09.
116. E.g., 109 CONG. REC. 5684 (1963); 1963 House Hearings, supra note 75, at
326 (statement of Bernard Cushman); 1962 House Hearings, supra note 69, at 220-21
(statement of George M. Harrison). The Memphis formula presents a publicism issue
in that its encouragement by the federal government motivated the private performance of tasks that have been adjudged appropriate for public intervention. This effect
of § 13(c) shows how-as a synthesis of labor policy, federalism judgments, and a
program to aid the provision of a public service-it has had results caused by, but
fully independent of, these individual components. Cf. supra note 17. This is certainly a tribute to the power of the extraneous condition. It should also serve as an
admonition to federal policy makers.
117. See, e.g., 1961 Conn. Pub. Acts 507, §§ 8, 9; 1945 I11.Laws 1171, §§ 28a, 29;
1947 Mass. Acts ch. 544, §§ 18, 19; 1957 Neb. Laws ch. 23, § 25; 1959 Pa. Laws
1266, § 13.
118. See, e.g., Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1965, 1965 Ind. Acts ch. 337, §
23 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-4-42 (Burns 1981)); 1964 La. Acts No. 127, §§
1-7 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (West Supp. 1982-1983)); 1965 Me.
Laws ch. 488 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4979 (1978)); Utah Pub.
Transit Dist. Act, 1969 Utah Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 12, §§ 30-33 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§

11-20-30,-33 (1973)).
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tive actions under it." 9 The influence of the federal statute is shown
not only in the words of these state laws, but in their effect. They
carve out a small piece of state and local governmental activity within
which workers possess rights of collective endeavor greatly in excess of
those allowed most public employees. 2 0
b. Mootness of Conflict
The federalism conflicts anticipated by Congress involved the loss
of employee rights arising from the application of pre-existing state

The Utah law has an explicit relationship to the federal statute: The rights,
benefits and other employee protective conditions and remedies of section
13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. . . as determined by
the Secretary of Labor, shall apply to the establishment and operation by
the district of any public transit service or system and to any lease, contract, or other arrangement to operate such system or services.
Id. § 11-20-30.
119.
The authority is authorized and directed from time to time to take all
necessary action to secure any federal assistance which is or may become
available to the commonwealth or any of its subdivisions . . . . It is the
intent of this section that the provisions of any federal law, administrative
regulation or practice governing federal assistance for the purposes of this
chapter shall, to the extent necessary to enable the commonwealth or its
subdivisions to receive such assistance and not constitutionally prohibited,
override any inconsistent provisions of this chapter.
1964 Mass. Acts ch. 563, § 18 (codified at MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 161A, § 29 (Michie/
Law. Coop. 1979) (amended by 1980 Mass Acts ch. 581, § 12). Accord, e.g., 1975
Wash. Laws, 1st Exec. Sess. ch. 270, § 8 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
35.58.2794 (1983)); see also 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 243, § 10(3) (codified at Ky. REV.
STAT. § 96A.090(3) (1982) (may enter into any agreement required in connection
with federal grants); 1967 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 204, § 6(e) (codified at MicH. COMP.
LAW § 124.406(e)(Supp. 1981-1982)) (do any and all things necessary or desirable to
secure federal financial aid).
An "all things necessary" clause has been interpreted by a California court to
resolve conflict between state and federal law in favor of the federal requirements.
Stockton Metropolitan Transit Dist. v. Division 276, ATU, 132 Cal. App. 3d 203,
213-15, 183 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29-30 (1982). A similar clause was used in Louisville to
authorize collective bargaining by the transit authority. Nolan, supra note 75, at 253
n.87.
Another means of state compliance involving special legislation was the creation of
mass transit public benefit corporations. These are treated as private entities, with
the municipality involved being the sole member of the corporation. Examples of this
form may be found in San Diego, Richmond, Roanoke, and Lynchburg. See City of
Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (M.D. Ga. 1977); 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 150-51 (statement of Clarence Pendleton, Jr.). See also 1963
House Hearings,supra note 75, at 483 (statement of W. Willard Wirtz) (reference to
availability of this form as a means of compliance).
120. See, e.g., BARNUM, supra note 58, at 78-84.
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policies.' 12 Conflict in the form of stubborn retrenchment never occurred, however. The enactment of the labor protection condition
effectively achieved its purpose. 22 Congressional optimism in envisioning compromise and seemingly voluntary compliance was validated. Although the theoretical federalism issue remains, it has no
practical vitality.
2. Direct Conflict with Subsequent State Enactments
Subsequent state enactments impairing the collective bargaining
and impasse resolution rights guaranteed by section 13(c) pose a more
difficult conflict that was not considered by Congress. In Local Division 589, A TU v. Massachusetts, 23 the First Circuit rejected a union's
claims that subsequent state laws which were inconsistent with an
existent section 13(c) agreement were violative of the supremacy
clause. 12 4 Inconsistency arose in July 1978, when the Massachusetts
legislature enacted a law mandating an impasse resolution method
slightly different from that provided in a 1974 section 13(c) agreement
that had enabled the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) to obtain capital and operating assistance grants.125 The
legislature aggravated the conflict in 1980 by passing a "management
rights" bill restricting the negotiating freedom of the MBTA. 26 This

121. See supra notes 111 & 112 and accompanying text.
122. The collective bargaining and related rights of workers in publicly-owned
and privately-owned systems are roughly the same, with the substitution of arbitration methods for the right to strike being the major difference. Section 13(c) is
undoubtedly the most important reason. BARNUM, supra note 58, passim; see STERN
& MILLER, supra note 59, at 62. The success of § 13(c) has prompted Barnum to
recommend it as a means of executing a broad federal labor policy concerning state
and local governmental employees. Barnum, National Public Labor Relations Legislation: The Case of Urban Mass Transit, 27 LAB. L.J. 168, 175-76 (1976).
123. 666 F.2d 618 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982).
124. 666 F.2d at 636.
125. The 1974 agreement utilized the interest arbitration procedures of the current contract. Agreement Pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as Amended 1 (Dec. 10, 1974), reprintedin Local Div. 589, ATU
v. Massachusetts, 511 F. Supp. 312, 337 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated, 666 F.2d 618 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Agreement
Pursuant to Section 13(c)]. In 1978, this procedure consisted of three arbitrators using
unspecified but presumably customary (previous local practice plus national and
regional comparisons) standards. 666 F.2d at 622. The new law, 1978 Mass. Acts ch.
405, required pre-arbitration mediation, a single local arbitrator with experience in
state and local finance, and a written decision, relying primarily on nine factors,
including the Authority's financial ability, the effect of any award on property tax
rates, and the wages, hours, and conditions of other workers in Massachusetts.
126. 1980 Mass. Acts ch. 581, § 8. The law forbids the MBTA to enter into wage
and benefit agreements providing for automatic cost-of-living adjustments or the
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law also limited the "all actions necessary" clause 27 of the enabling
act. 128
The First Circuit assumed that a conflict between the agreement
and the statutes existed and looked to the legislative history to ascertain whether Congress intended to prevent the enactment of inconsistent state laws. It analyzed the testimony, reports, and debates and,
although recognizing that the effect of section 13(c) on post-award
enactments is less clear, 129 it concluded that Congress did not intend to
supercede state law.1 30 In the court's view, a preemption of inconsistent subsequent law would: (1) federalize mass transit labor relations,
a result not inferable without a clear indication of intent; (2) run
counter to the express congressional recognition of the local character
of public transportation; (3) contradict the transitional purpose of
section 13(c); (4) deny the Secretary of Labor the discretion of determining whether a change affecting workers was actually harmful;
and (5) replace the congressionally envisioned enforcement mechanism of withholding funds. 131
3. Indirect Federalization: The Post-CertificationFederal Role
Section 13(c) was not accompanied by the creation of a structure for
regulating urban mass transit labor relations. A direct federalization
of this type was never considered. Special protections contained in the
transit system enabling acts provided their own enforcement structure, 1 2 and the appeal of the Memphis formula was its retention of
33
transit systems under the NLRA umbrella.1

inclusion of overtime earnings in the calculation of pension payments. The "management rights" portion of the legislation enumerates eight items about which the MBTA
is not authorized to bargain. They include staffing requirements, service levels,
overtime, employment standards, hiring, firing (subject to a negotiated grievance
procedure that may include binding arbitration) and the use of part-time workers.
Another recent example of "management rights" legislation, involving the metropolitan Atlanta transit system, is 1982 Ga. Laws 5101, 5104, § 3.
127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. 1980 Mass. Acts ch. 581, § 8. The MBTA no longer has the authority to
unilaterally subordinate state law in seeking federal assistance, and any inconsistency
between state and federal law threatening the receipt of funds must be reported to
the governor and the legislature. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 161A, § 29 (Michie/Law.
Coop. Supp. 1983).
129. 666 F.2d at 627-33.
130. Id. at 633.
131. Id. at 633-35.

132. See BARNUM, supra note 58, at 79-80, 82-84.
133. See id. at 81. See also supra note 103 and accompanying text. Only recently
has the Memphis strategy in fact had any assurance of validity, however. Subsequent
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are merely ave-

nues, however, by which states may make the accommodations that
are the necessary predicates to executing "fair and equitable arrangements." These arrangements are the focus of section 13(c), and the
means by which the Secretary of Labor warrants the protection of
36
transit employees from harm resulting from federal assistance.
Through their certification and inclusion in the grant contract, the
federal government becomes involved in determining contract terms.
Section 13(c) thus necessarily "federalizes" urban mass transit labor
relations to some extent.
a. Scope of "Fair and Equitable" Arrangements
To properly appreciate the federalism issue, it is essential to understand the dimensions of the "arrangements" required by section 13 (c).

to the UMT Act's passage, the NLRB declined jurisdiction in a number of cases
involving municipal services (including public transportation) provided under a
contract-management scheme. Its rationale was that the statutory exemption for
state and local governments, supra note 106, extended to private companies working
on their behalf. It applied a two-prong test: (1) whether the "degree of control"
possessed by the private entity is such that it is sufficiently independent of the
governmental unit to bargain effectively on its own; and (2) whether there is an
"intimate connection" between the services provided by the private company and the
functions of the exempt government. Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584
(1975). Private management companies operating publicly-owned transit systems
were held to fail the second prong. See, e.g., Mississippi City Lines, 223 N.L.R.B. 11
(1976); Transit Systems, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975).
This did not become a big problem for Memphis formula jurisdictions as there was
no incentive for either labor or management to challenge the NLRB's jurisdiction.
NLRA coverage is the standard underlying § 13(c), so the rights it provides are what
the unions are seeking. The management company's existence depends upon being
within the NLRA, in that the rights protected by § 13(c) are then assured and federal
funds remain available. The cases that did arise involved representation disputes
between rival unions, where the incentive for passivity does not exist. See Transit
Systems, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975); STERN & MILLER-LEcAL FRAMEWORK, supra
note 114, at 4. The situation was nonetheless unstable, and the Memphis formula
could have fallen apart if the unions had become dissatisfied. See id. at 51-52.
This potential was eliminated in 1979, when the Board abandoned the "intimate
connection" test, choosing to rely solely on the independence of the private employer.
National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979). Under this standard, the
Board asserted jurisdiction over the company managing the Brockton, Massachusetts
bus system. Baystate Bus Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 862 (1979). But cf. MTL, Inc., 223
N.L.R.B 1071 (1976) (on essentially identical facts, finding of insufficient degree of
control by private company). The Memphis formula is thus a valid means not only of
meeting the guarantees of § 13(c), but also of providing an enforcement structure for
the underlying rights.
134. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
136. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976).
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The statute requires arrangements "to protect the interests of employees affected by" federal transit aid. 37 The five essential guarantees 38
are easily applied using this standard when the aid is a grant for
acquisition of a private operation. A grant to purchase a fleet of new
subway cars "affects" workers less obviously, yet it is possible to
ascertain the resulting change in fleet operations.
Actual transactions are seldom this simple, however. For example,
in 1973 and 1974, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) applied for capital grants to finance general plant and facility improvements, acquisition and installation of machinery and
equipment, power and signal system improvements, acquisition and
installation of bus radios, purchase of new buses and track support
structure restorations. 39 Delimiting those "affected" by requested
funds in this type of situation is extremely difficult. The section 13(c)
agreement reached by the Authority and the unions described the
"affected" concept in terms of events occurring "as a result of the
Project." This was broadly defined:
The phrase "as a result of the Project" shall ... include events
occurring in anticipation of, during, and subsequent to the Project;
provided, however, that fluctuations and changes in volume or
character of employment brought solely by other causes are not
within the purview of the Agreement. The term "Project" ... shall
not be limited to the particular facility assisted by federal funds,
but shall include any changes, whether organizational, operational, technological or otherwise, which are traceable to the assistance provided, whether they are the subject of the grant contract,
reasonably related thereto, or facilitated thereby. 40
This problem of scope was exacerbated by the creation of operating
assistance grants in 1974.141 These general subsidy monies apply to no
identifiable segment of the system's operations. In fact, the apparent
effect of protecting those "affected" by such funds is to lock the
recipient into the entire array of practices involving employees that
are existent at the time of the initial grant.1 42

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
Agreement Pursuant to section 13(c), supra note 125, at 332.
Id. at 332-40.
See supra note 39.
The lack of a distinct and identifiable "project" is a key source of displeasure
among transit management regarding the scope of labor protection. STERN & MILLER,
supra note 59, at 92-93. See also PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 8-9
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The problems of creating arrangements to accomplish the statutory
task in this context prompted the Department of Labor to take actions
eventually resulting in the development of a Model Section 13(c)
143
Agreement by national representatives of labor and management.
This was adopted by the Department in 1978 as presumptively "fair
and equitable" for operating assistance grants.144 The Model Agreement is a long and complicated document, 45 culminating in the
transformation of section 13(c) from a device to protect workers from
the ill effects of public takeovers and automation to a federal imprimatur on a contract regulating every aspect of mass transit operation.
The result is a pervasive federal intrusion into what are at least
arguable zones of prerogative of state and local governments and their
46
agents.
b. Judicial Analysis
The use of conditions on the receipt of financial assistance regularly
1 47
operates to impose national policies on subnational governments.
This displacement of decision making involves Congress and the rest
of the federal apparatus in many aspects of state and local affairs, yet
it does not necessarily have the pervasiveness suggested by section
13(c) arrangements. These arrangements have the potential of recurrently enmeshing urban mass transit systems with a federal presence.
Ascertaining the amount of federal involvement engendered by the
congressional mandate is therefore critical. The inquiry is whether
section 13(c) is a "one-shot" or a continuing guarantor of collective
bargaining and other employee rights.
i. Expanding the Federal Judicial Forum
The post-certification federal role regarding section 13(c) arrangements has received federal judicial attention recently in the context of

(citing pervasive labor protection agreements as significant constraint on management flexibility and innovation).
143. See Curtis, supra note 99, at 628; Reed, The Urban Mass TransportationAct
and Local Labor Negotiation: The 13-C Experience, Spring 1979 TRANSP. J. 56, 5864 (1979); Wickham, supra note 13, at 71. The Model Agreement is structured
around the "Amtrak conditions" developed by the Secretary of Labor in 1971. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text; BARNUM, supra note 58, at 147.
144. 43 Fed. Reg. 13,558, 13,560 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 215.6 (1982)).
145. A copy of the Model Agreement may be found in JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM,

supra note 13, at 265-80.

146. See 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 126 (statement of Ray Mundy).

147. See C.

VANHORN,

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

3 (1979)

[hereinafter cited as VANHORN]; Neiman & Lovell, Federal & State Mandating, 14
AD. & Soc'Y passim (1982).
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union suits seeking enforcement. In 1974, the City of LaCrosse completed arrangements to acquire the system from its private owners. 148
Through the Municipal Transit Utility, it entered into a section 13(c)
agreement with the local union which provided for collective bargaining and arbitration procedures, including interest arbitration. 49 A
separate agreement, not providing for interest arbitration, set out the
actual terms and conditions of employment during the period of
transition to public ownership. Negotiations held after the expiration
of this "conversion agreement" reached an impasse, the union demanded interest arbitration, and arbitrators awarded a new collective
bargaining contract. After the contract expired and negotiations again
fell to impasse, the union again called for interest arbitration. LaCrosse refused the request, however, and the union sued under the
50
section 13(c) agreement.1
The threshold legal issues in Local Division 519, A TU v. LaCrosse
Municipal Transit Utility 151 were the existence of subject matter juris-

148. See Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util., 445 F. Supp. 798,
802 (W.D. Wis.), afJ'd, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978).
149. Two general types of labor arbitration exist. "Grievance" arbitration involves
disputes about interpretation or application of a provision of a collective bargaining
agreement or some other dispute arising under the agreement. "Interest" arbitration
involves disputes about what terms should be included in a collective bargaining
agreement. SMITH, MERFIELD, & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 103-04.
The inclusion of provisions for interest arbitration in § 13(c) agreements may be
the section's most important effect on mass transit labor relations. See 1982 Senate
Hearings, supra note 96, at 83 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart). One provision of
some § 13(c) agreements is that any labor dispute must be submitted to binding
arbitration at the request of either party. "Labor dispute" is then defined to include
the "making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements" and "the terms to
be included in such agreements." Local Div. 589, ATU v. Massachusetts, 511 F.
Supp. 312, 337 (W.D. Mass. 1980). Paragraph 4 of the Model Section 13(c) Agreement preserves whatever arbitration rights exist under existing collective bargaining
agreements, "subject to any changes in such agreements as may be agreed upon or
determined by interest arbitration proceedings." JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM,
supra note 13, at 266. The meaning of this rather cryptic language and other contract
interpretation questions involving these provisions have been the subject of dispute
and litigation. See Curtis, supra note 99, at 627. For further discussion, see Division
1447, ATU v. Louisville & Jefferson County Transit Auth., 659 F.2d 722 (6th Cir.
1981); Division 580, ATU v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 556 F.2d 659 (2d
Cir. 1977); Division 1212, ATU v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 483 F.
Supp. 37 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Division 1235, ATU v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 477
F. Supp. 1027 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), afJ'd, 650 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1981); Stockton
Metropolitan Transit Dist. v. Division 276, ATU, 132 Cal. App. 3d 203, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 24 (1982).
150. 445 F. Supp. at 802-03.
151. 445 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Wis.), afJ'd, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978).
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diction and a federal cause of action. 5 2 The court held that federal
question jurisdiction existed because the controversy was one "arising
under" the laws of the United States. 153 The success of the union's
claims would therefore depend upon an interpretation of the UMT
Act, 154 and whether a federal cause of action for the union could be
55
inferred in section 13(c).1
Preliminarily, the court found that contracts under the section must
be enforceable at the insistence of the contractual parties.5 5 The
uneven availability of state administrative mechanisms and the nature
of the dispute resolution task mandate the implication of judicial
enforcement.' 5 7 A test established in the landmark case of Cort v.
Ash' 58 was then applied to determine whether a private cause of
action could be judicially inferred under the federal statute. The court
found that the union was within the pr6tected class; the legislature
was silent on the existence of a remedy; such a suit was consistent with
the purposes of section 13(c), and; a national concern exists regarding
urban mass transit labor relations. Therefore, implication of a federal
remedy was appropriate. 19
Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's findings. 60° It stated that federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist,
because the section 13(c) agreement is intertwined with the UMT
Act. 16 1 The statute not only requires the making of the contract; it

152. 445 F. Supp. at 804, 811.
153. Id. at 809. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. V 1981).
154. 445 F. Supp. at 804-09.
155. Id. at 811. The court made this analysis despite its belief that once the
jurisdictional question was decided the question was irrelevant. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 812.
158. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court set out four factors that
are relevant in determining whether a private remedy should be inferred in a statute
such as the UMT Act that is silent on the issue: (1) whether plaintiff is of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislature indicated
any intent to create or to deny a remedy; (3) whether a private remedy is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislation; and (4) whether a federal cause of
action is inappropriate because the area is traditionally a state concern. Id. Cf. infra
note 297 (Supreme Court's limiting of implied private rights of action).
159. 445 F. Supp. 798, 812-20. In the discussion of the last factor-traditional
relegation to state law-the court noted the tension between state and federal law in
this area. It interpreted the legislative history as showing an awareness of the conflict
and an assertion of federal power to protect workers' rights and the stability of urban
mass transit systems. Id. at 817-19.
160. 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 1346.
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further requires the parties to abide by it. The agreement is not a mere
private contract once the Secretary of Labor's approval places it
Section 13(c) is thus at the heart of any
within the statutory scheme.
62
1
enforcement controversy.
Four other courts of appeal held similarly in analogous cases. Enforcement of the interest arbitration provisions of section 13(c) agreements was the remedy sought in suits involving transit systems in
65
64
3
Nashville, Tennessee,1
Portland, Maine, 16 Kansas City, Missouri,
and Seattle, Washington. 6 ' The issue in a suit against the Jackson,
Tennessee transit authority was the alleged breach of a section 13(c)
agreement's obligation to continue collective bargaining in the authority's repudiation of a collective bargaining contract and unilateral
reduction of benefits.' In each case, the court found the suit to be
one over which the federal judiciary has subject matter jurisdiction
68
and one that represents a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1
ii. Resistance
69
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently disagreed.1 The Metropolitan
Atlanta Regional Transit Authority (MARTA) had terminated certain
cost-of-living adjustments during the arbitration of the terms of a new
collective bargaining agreement. The union sought an injunction on
the ground that the current section 13(c) agreement prohibited any
170
alteration in contract conditions during interest arbitration.
MARTA defended by arguing that the court lacked172subject matter
17
jurisdiction to hear the suit,' and the court agreed.

162. See infra notes 318-19.
163. Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.

1978).

164. Division 1287, ATU v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
165. Division 1235, ATU v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir.
1981).
166. Division 587, ATU v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1981).
167. Local Div. 1285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379 (6th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
168. Portland,589 F.2d at 11-15; Kansas City, 582 F.2d at 449-50; Nashville, 650
F.2d at 1391-92; Seattle, 663 F.2d at 878; Jackson, 650 F.2d at 1382, 84-87.
169. Local Div. 732, ATU v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d
1327 (11th Cir. 1982).
170. Id. at 1329.
171. Id. at 1330. MARTA also argued that the union failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and that the Norris-La Guardia Act precluded issuance
of the injunction. Id.
172. Id. at 1346.
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The court rejected the idea that a breach of a section 13(c) agreement is a statutory violation, preferring to frame the inquiry as
whether the statute gives a private party the right to seek a remedy for
breach of contract in federal court. 7 3 In other words, the issue is
solely jurisdictional, for a private cause of action-a common law
contract claim-obviously exists. 7 4 Nonetheless, the private right of
action doctrine, focusing on legislative intent, provides a proper analytical framework. Using this, the court could find no intent to open
the federal courts to these suits. 175 In the court's view the questions
involved do not ask for interpretation of the federal statute but only
for a determination of the meaning and applicability of the particular
agreement. 17 The remedy is based solely on the contract, and the
contract is not mandated by federal law. 177 As a regular contractual
dispute, there is nothing requiring the special competence or perspective of the federal judiciary. 178
iii. Supreme Court Retrenchment
The Supreme Court settled these issues in June, 1982. On an appeal
in Local Division 1285, A TU v. Jackson Transit Authority, 17 the
Jackson, Tennessee case, a unanimous Court reversed the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 180 The court held that
section 13(c) does not permit a union suit in federal court based on
violation of the protective arrangements.' 8' It agreed with the court of
appeals that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed.' 8 2 Additionally, it found reasonable the conclusion that Congress anticipated
enforcement of the section 13(c) arrangements by private suits. 8 3 The
issue thus became the presence of a federal cause of action that would
enable the union to seek a remedy in federal court. 8 4 The relevant

173. Id. at 1332.
174. Id. at 1333.
175. Id. at 1334-45.
176. Id. at 1338.
177. Id. at 1341, 1344.
178. Id. at 1344-45.
179. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, ATU, 457 U.S. 15 (1982), rev'g,
650 F.2d 1379 (6th Cir. 1981).
180. 457 U.S. at 29. Justices Powell and O'Connor concurred, emphasizing that
the Court's reasoning appropriately limits access to the federal courts in the absence
of unambiguous legislative intent to create jurisdiction. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 29.
182. Id. at 21 n.6.
183. Id. at 20-21.
184. id.
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inquiry was whether the agreement envisioned by Congress was to be
85
a "creation of federal law," so that its content is federal in nature.1
Analyzing the legislative history, the Court determined that section
13(c) was to be a means of accommodating state law to the labor
relations structure existent in mass transit. 8 6 There was no intent to
invent a federal law of public transportation labor relations. State
policy, as affected by section 13(c), remained fully applicable. The
Court concluded that the section 13(c) agreement occupies the same
position as the collective bargaining contract; a breach of either is not
a violation of the statute or a deprivation of the federal rights secured
7
by it. 18
IV. New Approaches
This Article began by identifying two key challenges to the present
system of social organization: a desire for private sector provision of
many of the services delivered by government, and a desire to remove
the federal government from state and local affairs. These ideas are
based on a preference for private over public and local over federal.
The motivation for this preference stems from a perception that private actors are more efficient and effective.18 8 Tales of governmental
failures such as wastefulness and unresponsiveness are indeed commonplace.' 89 Many persons assume that any government task can be

185. Id. at 23.
186. Id. at 24-28.
187. Id. The result would be the same even if a breach of the arrangements
contract is interpreted as a violation of § 13(c) itself. Id. at 29 n.12.
188. See J. BENNETT & M. JOHNSON, BETTER GOVERNMENT AT HALF THE PRICE:
PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 19 (1981) ("[a]s every taxpayer knows,
government is wasteful and inefficient; it always has been and always will be"). The
authors, Bennett and Johnson, rely heavily on the "Bureaucratic Rule of Two"
posited by Thomas Borcherding: "Removal of an activity from the private to the
public sector will double its unit costs of production." THE SOURCES OF GROWTH IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. 1902-1970, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE
SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH (T. Borcherding ed. 1977). Cf. Sanoff, supra note
1, at 74 (describing government as "obese," "muscle-bound," "senile," and "incontinent," "having lost its capacity to perform"). But see Judis, supra note 2, at 138. For
a look at public sentiment in this area when the issue is given specific implications,
see The Gallup Opinion Index, Dec. 1978, at 22-24 (results of poll on public versus
private provision of community services).
189. See W. PROXMIRE, THE FLEECING OF AMERICA (1980) (famous exposition of
government waste). See also D. LAMBRO, FAT CITY: How WASHINGTON WASTES YOUR
TAXES (1980); Bureaucratic Bungling Hits Epidemic Levels, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 24, 1980, at 68.
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better performed by the business community with the aid of the free
market's invisible hand. 9 0 With respect to the activities that nonetheless remain governmental, the desire to localize them is indicative of a
suspicion of the federal government which has been present since the
inception of the republic. 19' It is from these perspectives that people
are developing new approaches to social organization, approaches
which may be seen in models for the urban mass transit industry.
A. The Models
1. The Transit-CorporationModel
A comprehensive concept indicative of current trends calling for
reduced government activity, particularly at the federal level, is the
transit-corporation model. 192 This model attempts to change the roles
of federal, state and local governments as well as that of the private
sector so that a more effective and efficient system may evolve.
The model is directed at six problems generally present in current
systems of governmental service provision.193 First, policies are made
that attempt to perform tasks not within the purview of general policy
making. 9 4 Second, there are no standards by which good performance may be gauged, and there are no incentives to ensure efficiency.

190. See ROTHBARD, supra note 2, at 194-96 (Libertarian idea that appropriate
free market exists for everything). But cf. Main, Why Government Works Dumb,
FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1981, at 146, 156 (despite merits of private enterprise, it is not
whole answer); BARNUM, supra note 58, at 164 (publicly-owned transit systems tend
to be more productive than private ones).
191. Our constitutional concepts of popular sovereignty may be found in the
political philosophies of the Enlightenment. See J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the
True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, reprintedin SOCIAL CONTRACT
3 (1960); D. HUME, Of the OriginalContract, reprintedin SOCIAL CONTRACT 147; J.
RoUssEAU, The Social Contract, reprinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT 168. Viable popular
sovereignty must be rooted in community. See Ramney & Kendall, Basic Principles
for a Model of Democracy, in EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY 46-49 (C. Cnudde &
1). Neubauer ed. 1969). A concern with centralized power is that it diminishes
popular sovereignty because of particular special interest groups to exploit their
influence in such an environment. Cf. HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at
34-35 (citing effects of the power of labor, elderly, and handicapped interest groups
at the national level).

192.

HAMILTON

& HAMILTON, supra note

105.

193. Id. at 10-11.
194. Four categories of policy are identified: (1) "general policies," which are
ambiguous goals providing no guidance for implementation; (2) "operating objectives," which are implementation guides with flexibility for expert discretion; (3)
"stipulations," which are very specific, inflexible implementation directives; and
(4)
"constraints of the absurd," which are obvious requirements that neither guide nor
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Third, both political and operational responsibility are diffused and
confused because of multi-level policy making. Fourth, this structure
also impairs planning capabilities through the creation of additional
uncertainty. Fifth, the removal of policy formation from the local
level often enables interest groups that have more power at other
levels to create imbalances and inefficiencies in programs. Finally,
this removal also leads to inattention to variations existing among
different systems and changes in single systems over time. The brief
overview of urban mass transit presented here reveals instances of
5
these problems. 11
The basic tool for alleviating these problems is the separation of
matters of broad policy from matters of daily operations.' 9 6 Policy
making is given to the public sector and managerial decisions are
reposed in private entities.197 The centerpiece is a transit-corporation
board 91 8 which has full responsibility for translating general policy 99
into clear and unconflicting operating objectives. 200 Management,
which is hired by the board, has full autonomy to operate the system
20
within the confines of these objectives. '
Public/private interfacing is an important part of the transit-corporation model. Public ownership with social-marginal-cost pricing 20 2 is
seen as the most viable corrective action for responding to the existence of various types of market failure in urban mass transit.20 3 The
corporation board, with its policy making functions, is designed to
provide the accountability necessary for any public operation. 20 4 To
achieve adequate incentives for efficiency, the transit system's management is forced to operate under conditions of "economic darwin-

constrain, such as a mandate for "integrity." Id. at 9. One of the book's themes is that
stipulations and constraints of the absurd are both useless and harmful, that general
policies are overused, and that operating objectives should be utilized more. Id. at
18-24, 32-33, 36, 47-56, 96, 98, 141.
195. This model views § 13(c) as a special example of the increased influence
particular political subgroups can have when policy making is removed from the
local level. Id. at 34.
196. See id. at 79-84.
197. Id. at 93-129.
198. See id. at 114-29.
199. See id. at 96.
200. See id. at 100.
201. See id. at 100, 110-11.
202. Social-marginal-cost pricing seeks to include all costs and benefits of an
economic activity, especially the external effects typically ignored in a regular market
environment, in the marginal cost calculations that serve as the output regulator for
profit-maximizing providers. See id. at 64-67, 70.
203. Id. at 61-62, 71.
204. See id. at 96-100.
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ism. ' 20 5 The model advocates competition among private firms for the
management contract, in which are embodied the operating objectives. 2 6 The private entities would work under the market account20 7
ability regime of profit maximization.
The first two problems of contemporary governmental service provision identified by the model 20 8 are dealt with by the basic public/
private-policy/operations structure; the other four are addressed in the
streamlining of the governmental participants. The local legislature
.may, of course, enact policy in creating the corporation. 20 9 Other
agencies (regional planning bodies, for example) may have input, but
they are constrained to an advisory role. 210 The model futher limits
federal and state governments. It contemplates their ascertaining the
adequacy of the legal structure created, monitoring civil rights compliance, and providing financial and technical assistance. Only block
grants are allowed, and no subsidies may be tied to compliance with
implementation directives or other operational policies. 2 1' Policy making is to be the domain of the local corporation board, which has
212
ultimate political authority and responsibility.
2. The Brokerage Concept
The concerns addressed in the transit-corporation model and the
balancing recommended are consonant with a contemporary idea
known as the brokerage concept. 21 3 The UMTA recently defined
transportation brokerage as "a market-oriented transportation strategy wherein an entity identifies various transportation markets and
needs, facilitates the development of an efficient market environment,
and matches the most appropriate services and providers to individual
markets. ' 21 4 Once again, as in the transit-corporation model, reliance

205. Id. at 101-02.
206. Id. at 103, 105-09.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 193 and text following.
209. See id. at 96, 141.
210. Id. at 142.
211. Id. The model attempts to "repudiate" the tying of financial aid to stipulations. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Fox & O'Neill, TransportationBrokering, PuB. MCGMT., July, 1982, at 15;
Orski, The Changing Environment of Urban Transportation,48 J.AM. PLAN. A. 309
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Orski, Changing Environment]; Orski, Urban Transportation: The Role of Major Actors, 34 TRAFFIC Q. 33 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Orski,
Major Actors]; Wickham, supra note 13.
214. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,410-11 (1982).
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is placed on the private sector, 2 15 due to the belief that the profit
motive and competitive drive will lead to lower costs, greater efficiency, and better service. Conventional bus and rapid. transit systems
have proven to be either inadequate or inappropriate for many transportation needs.2 1 The brokerage concept is designed to facilitate a
more diverse and market-responsive transit system. 217 It challenges
traditional ideas by distinguishing public provision of a service from
21 8
public production.
B. Paratransit
1. Generally
Central to the brokerage concept is the development of paratransit,2 19 "a family of transportation services, generally provided in small

vehicles, which are tailored to individual travel needs through flexible
scheduling or routing of vehicles. Services include carpooling, vanpooling, dial-a-ride, shared-ride taxi, jitney, airport limousine, and
subscription and route-deviated bus services. '

220

These intermediate

transport modes combine elements of the individualistic automobile
and traditional mass transit and operate in the hybrid publicism
environment of brokerage. 221 Additionally, paratransit has a special

215. See Kemp, Improving Public Transportationin a Changing FinancialEnviMGMT., July 1982, at 2-3.
216. Id. at 2 ("[i]n 1975 public transit accounted for less than 3 percent of the
nation's total urban passenger miles of travel, and the evidence suggests a further
decline in market share since then"). See generally Rumbling Toward Ruin, TIME,
Mar, 30, 1981, at 12 (overview of problems besetting urban mass transit).
217. See Orski, Changing Environment, supra note 213, at 311; Orski, Major
Actors, supra note 213, at 42-43.
218. Regarding advocacy of separation of provision and production, see, e.g.,
Wechsler, Four Approaches to the Use of the Private Sector in the Production of
Local Government Services, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION IN THE DELIVERY OF
LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES 42 (Univ. of Cal.-Davis, Inst. of Gov't Affairs 1980); Spann,
Public versus Private Provision of Government Services, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 89 (T. Borcherding ed. 1977).
219. See Wickham, supra note 13, at 63. For a general introduction to paratransit, see, e.g., R. KIRBY, K. BHATT, M. KEMP, R.McGILLIVRAY, & M. WOHL, PARATRANSIT: NEGLECTED OPTIONS FOR URBAN MOBILITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as KIRBY
& BHATT ]; Transportation Research Board, Nat'l Research Council, Nat'l Academy
of Sciences (Special Report 164), Paratransit (1976) [hereinafter cited as Transportation Research Board].
220. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,410 (1982).
221. Paratransit modes may be grouped into three categories: those that are hired
and driven, those that are hailed or phoned, and those that are prearranged and
shared with others. KIRBY & BHATr, supra note 219, at 7. For a table summarizing
the various delivery approaches actually employed for paratransit services, see URBAN DATA SERv. REP., Oct. 1982, at 11.

ronment, PUn.
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attractiveness for transit agencies because it can meet the transportation needs of elderly and handicapped persons. 222 Many in the urban
mass transit field, including the Urban Mass Transportation Adminismanifestatration itself, are relying on paratransit in its various
223 However, labor is not among its advocates. 224
tions.
2. Section 13(c) as an Obstacle
The federal government and its conditions, particularly section
13(c), is a major obstacle to the institution of paratransit and the
concepts it represents. A critique of section 13(c)'s applicability to
paratransit identifies two problems. 22 5 First, the provision extends
work rules and wage rates developed in conventional transit to an
environment to which they are inapplicable. For example, the common restrictions on the use of part-time employees and split-shifts
thwart the efficient development of alternative modes. 226 The second
problem is the conflict between the restrictions imposed by the protections of section 13(c) and the brokerage concept's open bidding between suppliers. 227 The inclusion of paratransit within the scope of
section 13(c) has led to the development of a "fence" concept that
provides for no competition with or replacement or displacement of
established conventional service. 22 8 This has diminished the flexibility
of the brokerage approach and limited the development of alternative
modes .2219
222. See KIRBY & BHATT, supra note 219, at 41-42. See generally U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Handicapped & Elderly Market for Urban Mass Transit (1973).
223. See, e.g., KiRBY & BHATT, supra note 219, at 41-42; Hemily & Meyer, supra
note 50, at 297; BURKE, supra note 7, at 60-61, 80; cJ. MEYER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra
note 17, at 55, 73-74 (envisioning a role for paratransit, as long as its inherent
limitations are recognized).
Regarding the use of paratransit modes in non-urban areas, see Public Transit in
Small Cities and Counties, URB. DATA SEv. REP., May 1982, at 1.
224. The ATU supported paratransit from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, on
the ground that it would stimulate and capture new ridership. STERN & MILLER,
supra note 59, at 142. The ATU now sees paratransit as a threat to workers in its role
as a competitive or substitutive service. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 359
(statement of John Rowland). For an overview of labor issues in paratransit, see
KIRBY & BHATT, supra note 219, at 257-59; Smith, Labor Implicationsfor Paratransit
Service, in Transportation Research Board, supra note 219, at 127.
225. Wickham, supra note 13, at 64.
226. Id. at 73-74. Transit industry work rules often require premium pay for
employees who work during both morning and evening peak ridership periods of the
day, guarantee certain employees a full week's pay regardless of whether forty hours
are worked, and closely prescribe job categories so that idle workers often may not be
utilized. Id.
227. Id. at 64, 75-78.
228. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 359 (statement of John Rowland).
229. See id. at 84-85 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart). For a review of the contro-
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C. Curtailment of Section 13(c)
The Transit Assistance Act of 1982, proposed by the Reagan Administration, but not passed by Congress, would have dramatically
curtailed if not in fact eliminated section 13(c). 2 30 It advocated ending
all operating subsidies after 1984. Ninety percent of the capital monies
that would have been available were in a new block grant program to
which section 13(c) was not applicable. Privately provided paratransit
would have been excluded from the reach of the provision. Finally,
administration of labor protection would have been shifted from the
23
Department of Labor to the Department of Transportation. 1
Other efforts are being made to curtail section 13(c). The Urban
Mass Transportation Administration has expressed its distaste for the
law. 232 The Department of Labor has been pressured to change its
policies so that the provision is weakened and new regulations are
expected. 233 Department actions, with apparent judicial approval,

versy over the applicability of § 13(c) to the paratransit services offered by small
towns and rural areas under the Surface Transportation Act of 1978, see Stanfield,
Labor Protection Clause Gives Rural Transit Operators Fits, 11 NAT'L J. 1127 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Stanfield].
230. S. 2367, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), printed in 1982 Senate Hearings, supra
note 96, at 6-27. Conflict between President Reagan and unions became evident
early in his term and intensified dramatically after the air traffic controllers' strike.
See, e.g., Barbs for an Old Union Man, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 14-15. State and
local government employees have been directly and adversely affected by the administration's budget cuts. See, e.g., The Reagan Cuts Hit Local Workers, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 23, 1981, at 51-52.
231. Id. The unions see a shift of § 13(c) certification out of the Department of
Labor as a major diminution of the section's protection. See Resolution No. 67,
adopted by Fourteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO (Nov. 17, 1981),
reprinted in 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 365-66. There is a perception
that the UMTA and the Department of Transportation are allies of transit management and that the Department of Labor is predisposed to the interests of the unions.
M. Rothenberg, Public Transportation: An Element of the Urban Transportation
System 170 (Report to the Department of Transportation, Feb. 1980); see Stanfield,
supra note 229, at 1128; see also JENNINGS, SMITH & TRAYNHAM, supra note 13, at 37.
232. 1981 House Hearings,supra note 96, at 379-83 (statement of Arthur E. Teele,
Jr., Admin'r, UMTA); cf. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,410-11 (1982) (presence of labor protection arrangements inconsistent with "free market" approach to paratransit will be
considered in determining project funding).
233. See Curtis, supra note 99, at 628-29. Regulations are expected to provide that
the five specific statutory guarantees will be the only prerequisites for certification,
with anything additional subject to mandatory local negotiation. Curtis, supra note
99, at 630. In addition, the character of the statutory guarantees is uncertain because
of Labor Department interpretations. See infra note 170. Even though the Departments of Labor and Transportation have a very uneasy relationship, see Stanfield,
supra note 229, at 1128, the transfer of administration of these new guidelines to
Transportation would win its adherence. 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 383
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already indicate an approach more accommodating to management
interests. 23 4 Additionally, the Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson Transit Authority235 and the First Circuit's holding in Local Division 589,
A TU v. Massachusetts236 provide an avenue for the states to circumvent section 13(c) through the enactment of contrary laws (or application of existing laws 237), the effect of which on labor protection arrangements could then be ignored by federal authorities, with the
judiciary powerless to interdict.

(answers to questions submitted to the Department of Transportation by Senators
Riegle and Dixon).
234. See ATU v. Donovan, 554 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1982). In Donovan, the
central dispute was the Secretary of Labor's conditional certification of grants to
three transit authorities despite the lack of an agreed method of impasse resolution.
In each case, management refused to agree to the usual provision for the submission
of impasses to binding interest arbitration. Certification was given on the condition
that negotiations would continue. The unions involved sued for review of the Secretary's action as an abuse of discretion and for a temporary injunction to prevent
disbursement of the grant funds. Id. at 591-93. A Labor Department official, in an
affidavit submitted to the court, interpreted § 13(c) to not require any particular
form of impasse resolution, and he stated that certification without any such procedure would be allowed in some circumstances. In fact, the affidavit indicated an
abandonment of the concept that some form of mandatory, binding impasse resolution process was required by at least the spirit of § 13(c) as a quid pro quo for the last
right to strike. Id. at 593, n.6. The court, relying on Local Div. 589, ATU v.
Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982), and
the legislative history, stated that § 13(c) does not require any mandatory or enforceable form of impasse resolution. Donovan, 554 F. Supp. at 597-99. Accordingly, it
denied the preliminary injuction (while expressing severe doubt on the merits of the
unions' primary case). Id. at 599-600.
235. 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
236. 666 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982). Although
the Court in Jackson makes only one brief reference to the First Circuit's case, 457
U.S. at 20 n.5, its reasoning is fully consistent with that of the lower court. See id. at
26-28.
237. An example of this occurred in Atlanta after the MARTA decision, see supra
notes 144-151 and accompanying text, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson, see
supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text. MARTA was engaged in interest arbitration with the local union pursuant to the governing § 13(c) agreement when the
Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion. MARTA's governing board voted to withdraw
from the arbitration, and the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the vote. Local Div.
732, ATU v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 251 Ga. 15, 303 S.E.2d 1, 3
(1983). The Georgia court interpreted Jackson to dictate the application of state law
to both enforceability and revocability of mass transit arbitration agreements. Id. at
4. Georgia law permits such a revocation of an agreement to arbitrate, id. at 5;
therefore the federal protection provided by § 13(c) was nullified. Whether the union
can force the Secretary of Labor to declare that the "fair and equitable" arrangements governing MARTA have been infringed upon is being litigated now. Id. at 5
n.2, See also Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Mass Transit Admin.,
453 A.2d 1191, 1194 n.4 (Md. 1982) (interpreting Jackson to mandate state law
supercession of any federal rights possibly protected by § 13(c) agreement).
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V. Theoretical Foundations

A. A Theory of Publicism
The present pattern of social ordering and the complaints which
follow from it are best understood by constructing theories of publicism and federalism. 238 A theory of publicism must begin with the
realization that ours is a privately-oriented system in which there is a
rebuttable presumption in favor of individual, voluntary effort, to the
extent that most public activities are called "intervention. ' 23 This
does not preclude governmental activity, however, for when the private market fails, 240 society must utilize an alternative regulatory
scheme to achieve its goals. The increased activity of the public sector
indicates that society has diagnosed numerous situations in which free
competition results in an inefficient allocation of resources.
Non-allocational problems with the competitive system, chiefly
maldistribution of income, also lead to market failure. 24 1 More
broadly, society often desires policy outcomes that are not amenable
to the price regulator utilized by the individually-oriented private
market and which cannot be reached through decentralized consensus
due to the absence of a total congruity of value hierarchies. 242 As the
instrument for collective action, government intervenes in the market
to achieve these outcomes.
B. A Theory of Federalism
Once public intervention is justified, the question becomes what
level(s) of government should undertake it. Actually, the inquiry is
whether the presumption in favor of state activity (with local levels
subsumed within this) has been rebutted. As with public endeavor
generally, federal actions are termed interventionist and are justifi2 43
able only if necessary.

238. See generally supra note 5.
239. See SCHULTZE, supra note 105, at 13-15.
240. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
241. See BARRETT, supra note 11, at 53-56. See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
801-22 (9th ed. 1973) (inequality of income distribution under laissez-faire leads to
programs to establish equality).
242. See generally LIPsEY & STEINER, supra note 11, at 427-28 (neglect of nonmarket goals as a source of market failure).
243. See Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the State
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 544-46 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
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1. StructuralNecessity
The central justification for the exercise of federal power is the
inability of other levels of government to properly perform a task.
This is what gave birth to a central government in 1789.244 A unified
nation must have a national government to address those matters
outside the scope of control of the various subnational units. If there is
to be effective public sector activity, some amount of federal intervention is inevitable.
2. Federal Supremacy
This theory of federalism embodies a restrictive theory of federal
power. Nonetheless, to implement federal actions taken for reasons of
subnational structural impotency, the dominion effected by the supremacy clause 245 is essential. 246 This inevitable constitutional concession proves fatal to the barriers erected by "limited government" and
"delegated powers" because allowing federal law to take precedence
automatically forces a capitulation to any federal power exercised.
Relief through extra-constitutional states' rights may have once been
viable, yet this avenue is now precluded by the Civil War's reiteration
of national supremacy. 247 Even the limitations presupposed by a restrictive theory of federal power effectively require federal acquiescence through the concurrence of that level's courts. The only source
of state or local autonomy is thus the self-restraint of the federal

244. Arising from the pre-revolutionary British scheme for division of powers
between the central, imperial government and the colonial government, D. HUTCHINSON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 83-85 (1928), "[t]he delegated
powers were merely the concrete embodiment in terms of the political experience of
the eighteenth century of the principle that the new national government was to have
the powers necessary to deal with all truly national problems." Cushman, Social and
Economic Control Through Federal HELP!Taxation, 18 MINN. L. REV. 759, 760
(1934). In other words, the federal legislative power was formulated to be triggered
by the incompetency of the states to act. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns
More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337-45 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Stern]. See also THE FEDEALIST No. 23, at 152 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Id. (A.
Hamilton); Id., No. 41, at 255 (J. Madison); Id., No. 42, at 264 (J. Madison)
(concerning war, coinage and similar powers).
245. "[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

246. See

THE FEDERALIST

No. 34, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)

(supremacy clause merely declares the necessary truth arising from institution of
national government; furthermore, "law" inherently means supremacy).
247. See Note, Section 1983 and Federalism (Developments in the Law), 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133, 1181 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism].
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government. The significance of this fact is amplified by the de facto
supremacy concept of the publicism realm, in which properly taken
governmental actions, carrying the power of the sovereign, usurp
contrary private prerogatives. 248 Therefore, the federal government,
249
in its various manifestations, is the key actor in the social system.

248. There are, of course, limits on governmental intrusions upon personal rights
and freedoms. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-IX, XIV.
249. The malignancy of the supremacy concept is illustrated by the commerce
clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[t]he Congress shall have power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce ... among the several States..."). The existence of this legislative power is so clearly within the restrictive model that it is one of the most
commonly cited examples of the structural inadequacies of a confederacy of states.
See Stern, supra note 244, at 337 ("[t]he Constitutional Convention was called
because the Articles of Confederation had not given the Federal Government any
power to regulate commerce"). The development of a nationwide economic system
destroyed any self-limiting value possessed by the clause, however. See, e.g., United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (the Court recognized that, "in present-day
industry," various small economic units could have a large cumulative effect on the
national order, so that they must be amenable to federal influence. Id. at 123. See
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). As advocated by
Stern, supra note 244, at 1364-65, and others, the Supreme Court eventually characterized the extent of federal commerce clause power as being determined by economic circumstances. In this environment, it is difficult to draw a line between
legitimate federal power and the gratuitous usurpation of state and local (and
private) policy choices arising from normative disagreements. The Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000a (1976)), however desirable, shows the extremes to which the supposedly limited commerce clause may be extended. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
298 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
The attempt to revitalize judicially a federalism limitation through use of other
constitutional provisions must employ distinctions between the legitimate and the
illegitimate that appear as insincere and contrived as the concept attacked. For
example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court held
that federal legislative power could not reach attributes of sovereignty relating to
functions essential to the states' separate and independent existence. Id. at 845. It
then concluded that regulation of the wages and hours of state and local employees
engaged in certain activities-fire, police, sanitation, public health, parks and recreation, hospitals and schools, but not railroads-encroached on this zone of immunity. Id. at 851, 854 n.18, 855. Since then, the Court has ruled that federal delineation of the collective bargaining and strike rights of workers on a commuter railroad
and application of federal age discrimination laws to state parks employees are not
prohibited as infringements on state sovereignty. See United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). Cf.
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) (setting out
four-prong test for traditional governmental function and finding municipal airport
to be within it); 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.3-775.4 (1982) (Wage and Hour Administrator's
determination of traditional and non-traditional functions for purposes of administration and enforcement of Fair Labor Standards Act).
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3. Federal Government as Financier
The rapid expansion of the federal government is attributable in
large part to growth in monetary aid programs, most all of which
flow to or through subnational jurisdictions.2 10 The variety of avenues
for the federal provision of money is staggering.2 5 1 A legitimate federal
role as financier is within the contemplation of the restrictive model
because states and localities are limited in their territorial jurisdiction.
They are also competitive.2 52 These characteristics result in a fiscal
system racked with externalities and involuntary adherence to the

250. Federal domestic expenditures-consisting largely of assistance under the
"social security" rubric and aid to state and local governments-rose from 1.5
percent of the gross national product in 1929 to 15.9 percent in 1980. In 1972
constant dollars, this was a rise from $37 per capita in 1929 to $1,025 in 1980. U.S.
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal
Federalism 12-13 (1981-82 ed.) [hereinafter cited as Significant Features of Fiscal
Federalism]. The proportion represented by outlays for state and local governmental
assistance rose significantly in the Great Society period and was nearly one-quarter of
gross national product by 1975, with the inclusion of general revenue sharing. See
U.S. Comptroller General, Fundamental Changes are Needed in Federal Assistance
to State and Local Governments 5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fundamental
Changes]. These outlays totaled $51.2 billion in 1980. Significant Features of Fiscal
Federalism, supra, at 66. Overviews of these intergovernmental transfers may be
found in J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS: ITS PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 224-27 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BOLLENS & SCHMANDT]; J.
HANUS, THE NATIONALIZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT 9-11 (1981).
251. Included here are loans, loan guarantees, insurance arrangements, tax expenditures, and the like, all of which are proliferating as tools of governmental
(generally federal level) activity. See Salamon, Rethinking Public Management:
Third-PartyGovernment and the Changing Forms of Government Action, 29 PUBLIC
POLICY 255, 257 (1981); see also Weidenbaum, The Use of Government's Credit
Power, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 211-26 (K. Boulding &
T. Wilson ed. 1978).
252. A central feature of metropolitan areas is a plethora of local governmental
units. BOLLENS & SCHMANDT, supra note 250, at 42-47. Various districts, municipalities, and the like compete for scarce resources as they seek to provide adequate
services, engaging periodically in jurisdictional battles. Id. at 35. In the wake of New
Federalism and other programs designed to revivify the states, the issue of their
competitive environment is garnering increased attention. Severance taxes and water
rights are particular items of contention. Additionally, in an effort to attract or retain
businesses and produce more tax revenues, states have been employing such competitive tools as industrial' development loans and selective regulatory relief. See P.
PASSELL & L. Ross, STATE POLICIES AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS: PRIORITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 8-12 (1978); Now Energy is What Counts in the War Between the States,
Bus. WK., July 19, 1982, at 166; Stone, Next: State vs. State?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 8, 1982, at 76; Tax Cuts-and More-to Woo Business, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1982, at 26; The Withering Away of the States, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 28, 1981, at 17.
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least common denominator. 253 Central cities are unable to tax suburban residents who use or benefit from the cities' services. 254 The states
may interject to equalize costs and benefits,2 55 yet they must also keep
their spending at levels that are low enough to avoid creating interjurisdictional imbalances.2 5 The metropolitan area may even lie in
more than one state, so that the inequities are extremely difficult to
mitigate in any manner. 257 Only the federal government, with no
interstate economic barriers, has the authority and ability to exercise
power over the full geographic scope of individual decision-making
systems. Therefore, it plays an essential role in raising the revenues
deemed necessary to finance a variety of governmental endeavors. 258
Even under the minimalist model of federal authority, there are farreaching federal powers of fiscal redistribution.
VI. Theoretical Applications
A. Urban Mass Transit

1. The Need for Federal Financing
The history of urban mass transit evidences the concepts of these
models. 259 The changes in public transportation, radical as they may
253. See, e.g., BOLLENS & SCHMANDT, supra note 250, at 214-16;
URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 343-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited

J.

HEILBRUN,

as HEILBRUN].
254. For a brief summary of the differing viewpoints on the issue, see HEILBRUN,
supra note 253, at 342-43.

255. See, e.g., J.

MAXWELL &

J.

ARONSON,

FINANCING STATE & LOCAL GOVERN-

77-86 (3d ed. 1977); U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations,
State Aid to Local Government 5-12 (1969).
256. Sound economic and fiscal policy compels the maintenance of a competitive
tax climate relative to other states so that inadequate financing of necessary public
services often results. R. THOMPSON, REVENUE SHARING: A NEW ERA IN FEDERALISM? 5
(1973) (statement of Gov. Milliken of Michigan) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON]; see
also M. REAGAN & J. SANZONE, THE NEW FEDERALISM 42-52 (2d ed. 1981) (many state
and local governments are unable to fully utilize tax capacities because of the
practical need to attract businesses) [hereinafter cited as REAGAN & SANZONE]; supra
note 252.
257. See U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations Toward More
Balanced Transportation 76 (1974).
258. In addition to its jurisdictional attributes, the federal government has possessed superior ability to raise money because of the inherent qualities of the revenue
mechanisms it utilizes. It has relied primarily on the relatively flexible and progressive income tax while state and local governments have depended on sales and
property taxes. This is an integral feature of this model, for the state and local tax
structure is tied to the fact that sales and property taxes are less vulnerable to the
jurisdictional problems outlined above. See REAGAN & SANZONE, supra note 256, at
33-52; THOMPSON, supra note 256, at 18-36.
259. See supra notes 6-39 and accompanying text.
MENTS
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be, can be analyzed within the basic models of publicism and federalism. The nature of transit technology progressively reduced the number of firms the market could support. Natural monopoly soon resulted. 260 In response to this failure of the market, public entities
intervened in an attempt to achieve through regulation the goals a
functioning system would have provided through competition. Governmental involvement increased as the private sector became an
inadequate service provider. 26 As the need for massive public intervention rose, however, the limitations of state and local governmental
units became evident. The chief problem was fiscal incapacity, and a
26 2
call for federal intervention as a financier was made.
2. Attached Conditions
The perniciousness of federal aid for those who wish to restrict
federal power arises from the fact that the funds flowing from Washington to programs such as urban mass transit do not come unaccompanied. Conditions are attached to the prodigality. 26 31 Governmental
activities are political, and include the bargaining and compromise
connoted by that adjective. 26 4 Before Congress approves an expenditure, a majority of the individual decision makers, theoretically each
representing a larger set, must agree on its desirability. Power exists in
money like potential energy in a resting object, and this repository is
tapped in return for each vote. The result is that federal expenditures
come with strings attached.
3. Results
The placement of conditions on the receipt of federal aid is not
presumptively illegitimate. Appropriations are not given to state or
local governments without assurances that they will be used in accordance with national principles of equality and in furtherance of a

260. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
263. This has been termed "flypaper federalism." Peirce & Hamilton, "Flypaper
Federalism"-States,Cities Want to Shed Rules that Accompany Aid, 13 NAT'L L.J.
1636 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Peirce & Hamilton]. The most basic concern with it
is the threat it poses to the concept of self-governing local governments. See C.
ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 307 (1977). See also notes 37-49 and
accompanying text.
264. Cf. DANIELSON, supra note 19, at 132 (alteration of original proposal for an
urban mass transportation assistance act to broaden its appeal).
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public purpose. 265 Even the most general revenue sharing will contain
certain basic conditions.266 An intermediate line delimiting permissibility is virtually impossible to draw. For example, support for a
requirement that local mass transit projects be approved by the state
department of transportation may arise either from a concern with
municipal profligacy or from the influence of national highway lobbyists. 267 No tribunal to ascertain the motivations behind a member of
Congress' vote, and no standards of "right" and "wrong" representation exist. Conditions thus legitimately range from the obvious and
unquestionable to requirements attached in furtherance of extraneous
objectives.
Present controversy concerning urban mass transit stems from the
realization that the system's configuration is not based on a rational
theory or plan. 268 Governments have become too active in the delivery
of services, replacing an efficiency-directed market with a politicscentered monopoly. 269 The involvement of federal and state governments has especially worsened the situation; whatever incentives for
good performance localities have are thwarted by imposed policies not
linked to the service delivery goal. 270 The result of these various gov-

265. Cf. REAGAN & SANZONE, supra note 256, at 74.
[B]oth constitutionally and politically, we have as a nation accepted the
notion that it is appropriate for the national community to embed its scale
of values (i.e., those values that a majority of national legislators can agree
upon) in programs that offer state and local governments inducements to
be persuaded that the national scale of values should also be the local
priorities.

Id.
266. The Nixon-era general revenue sharing plan, enacted as the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, §§ 121-23, 86 Stat. 919, 931-34
(1972), imposed a number of conditions on recipient governmental units. Each was
required to submit a report on the planned and actual use of funds. No program or
activity funded in whole or in part with revenue sharing funds could involve any
discrimination on account of race, color, national origin, or sex. The Act required
certain fiscal procedures, including the establishment of a trust fund and the use of
regular audits. Certain governmental employees and all laborers and mechanics
employed on construction projects of which twenty-five percent or more of the costs
were paid with revenue sharing funds were guaranteed wages not below the prevailing rates. Id.

267. See generally D. Taebel & J. Cornehls,
TRANSPORTATION 81-93

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN

(1977).

268. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 2 ("[i]t appears that American politics has shaped government enterprise haphazardly to fit specific practical problems or perchance simply to reach an end without much regard to the
means .. .").
269. See, e.g., id. at 9-11, 18-36, 93-94, 111.
270. See id. at 32-36.
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ernmental endeavors is, unsurprisingly, an inadequately operating
system. 271
B. The Transit-Corporation Model
The transit-corporation model 27 2 exhibits an understanding of the
basic publicism issues of social ordering. It acknowledges the existence
of market failure and the manner in which market failure justifies
public action. 273 This is unavoidable, for the presumption of government inaction is readily rebuttable in a variety of areas. 27 4 Recognizing the legitimacy of intervention, the model carefully analyzes the
methods. 275 It moves away from the traditional "all-or-nothing" philosophy that rejects all market-style approaches once some type of
failure is diagnosed. 276 The model is thus centered in the area within
which meaningful publicism debate may occur.
From this foundation, however, the desire for rational social policy
becomes an unfortunate obstruction. The model fails to recognize the
indivisibility of involvement and power. This is evident in the rather
detached manner with which local governments are envisioned to
establish the transit-corporation board and construct conditions of
economic darwinism. 277 The excessive reliance on altruism and trust is
even more manifest in the federalism context. The model mentions a
federal monetary role only briefly, and this is in the context of emphasizing the need to restrict aid to minimally-conditioned block
grants.2 78 Although the model thus implicitly acknowledges the inevitability and rationality of federal financial involvement in contemporary public interventions, it fails to confront squarely the attendant
inevitability and rationality of extraneous conditions on the receipt of
federal aid.

271. Id. at 143 ("In mass transit ... concern with governance has not progressed
much beyond hoping for the best by appointing public-spirited officials and by
utilizing financial audits to prevent outright fraud.").
272. See supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
273. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 61-64.
274. If libertarian-style abdication is viable, it must be because the relevant
market failure is tolerable or because any public involvement is inevitably worse. At
least for urban mass transit, the history of governmental intervention, see supra notes
11-35 and accompanying text, reflects a contrary social judgment.
275. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 63-84.
276. See SCHULTZE, supra note 105, at 46, 66.
277. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 93-129.
278. Id. at 142.
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C. The Verdict on Conditions: Inefficient, Inevitable, Rational
The desire to separate the dollars from the attached strings is not
surprising. There is no obvious justification for using categorical,
programmatic, or general assistance as a vehicle for the achievement
of extraneous policy goals, particularly when they are merely concessions arising from coalition building. Concurrently, few can avoid
advocating some use of extraneous conditions. The transit-corporation
model permits federal overview of the legal frameworks and federal
monitoring of civil rights compliance.2 79 This is contrasted with a
strong prohibition on the use of federal money to achieve policy
direction.2 80 The model thus utilizes the usual technique of drawing
an intermediate line of permissibility.
The line drawn by the model is a defensible one. Assuring an
efficacious legal structure may be intimately and directly related to
the program of aiding urban mass transit. The federal role in the
protection of civil rights has constitutional roots.2 81 These facts notwithstanding, the essence of line-drawing is the executing of a value
judgement. Normative prescriptions made without the full consent of
the governed are suspect in a pluralistic and relativistic society. The
acceptability of the particular conditions of the transit-corporation
model cannot imply that others are not equally legitimate. 28 2 One set
of standards is not and cannot be the referent for all decision makers.
The central theme of the federalism model is that even restrictive
conceptions of federal power are incapable of imposing limits other
than those voluntarily undertaken by federal policy makers. The Constitution does not exact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,2 83 and it
does not establish the means by which the federal government will
intervene in the urban mass-transit industry. It cannot and it should
not.
279. Id. at 94, 142. The Transit Assistance Act of 1982, S. 2367, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982), adopted a similar course, relying on self-certification by grant recipients
of compliance with all aid conditions except for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and
the private enterprise protections of the UMT Act. See 1982 Senate Hearings, supra
note 96, at 3 (statement of Secretary of Transportation Lewis). See also supra notes
230-31 and accompanying text.
280. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 94, 142.
281. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
282. For example, Congress is empowered to provide for and may be expected to
act in furtherance of the "common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Conditions directed toward this end thus
possess legitimacy.
283. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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VII. The Judicial Role
A. Constitutionally Imposed Restraint
There are two mechanisms available for those who wish to impose
order on the irrationality of extraneous conditions. One is the conscious development by the Supreme Court of a constitutional federalism doctrine containing a generally acceptable standard that limits
federal power yet preserves the necessary implications of a restrictive
theory.
The area between patently illegitimate exercises of federal power
and undeniably permissible imposition is a narrow one which defies
clear definition.21 4 Whatever its precise parameters, its narrowness

284. The present state of the limitation of federal power on federalism grounds is
contained in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and its possibly
nullifying progeny. E.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). These cases, each of which upheld the
challenged exercise of federal power, presaged the evisceration of NationalLeague of
Cities in EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). National League of Cities
remains a timely subject for analysis, however, for it has yet to be overruled, and it
exists as the only operative utilization of a tenth amendment or related limitation on
federal power (to the viability of which four justices continue to adhere, see id. at
1058 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). The Court in National League of Cities does not
explicitly base its holding on the reserved sovereignty concept of the tenth amendment. It refers to the potential for a less restrictive result for federal exercises of the
spending and civil rights' enforcement powers. 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17. Cf. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981) (there are limits on
congressional power to impose conditions on states through use of spending power).
Because differences in the strength of federal powers must be tied to the nature of the
relevant delegation, this indicates that it was the commerce clause basis for the FLSA
amendments that precluded their attempted reach. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 476 (1980) (avoiding National League of Cities limitations through analysis
of powers of civil rights' enforcement). The Court's analysis avoids any discussion of
the scope of the commerce power, however, relying instead on arguments of sovereignty:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it
from exercising the authority in that manner.
Id. at 845. This would necessarily apply to all exercises of federal power. The only
way in which the limitation on federal power could apply differentially without
reference to the nature of the delegation would be through interpreting National
League of Cities as instituting a balancing test. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring); cf. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 n.9 (even if
federal law impairs state sovereignty, federal interest may be sufficiently great to
justify it). For conditions based on the spending power, this would measure the
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indicates that a constitutional bar on federal aid conditions will certainly not affect the full breadth and depth of their reach. 2 15 If the
federal government is overreaching, it must be because the government is using the grant relationship to achieve a policy objective not
otherwise within its powers. If the federal policy executed through a
condition is one that could be enacted directly, there is no room for
invalidation. 288 Only a few extremely intrusive conditions on receipt
of federal aid-such as moving the state capital-are left amenable to
abrogation .287

infringement on state autonomy against the federal interest promoted. Dam, The
American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 271, 293-94 (1977).
285. Professor Tribe asserts that the Court has settled the question of the reach of
National League of Cities to the spending power, holding it inapplicable, in its
summary affirmance in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962
(1978), aff'g, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977). L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (1979 Supp.). It is clear that section 13(c) is unassailable constitutionally, for it does not impermissibly impose on the states. The 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that were the subject of National League of Cities
also fully repealed the exemption for urban mass transit employees. Pub. L. No. 93259, § 21, 88 Stat. 68 (1974). Although not ruling directly on the question, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the principles of United Transp. Union-that
,operation of a railroad is not an integral part of traditional state activity, so that
regulation of it does not impair the state's role or endanger its separate and independent existence, 455 U.S. at 684-86-are applicable to mass transit, thus removing it
from the reach of the state sovereignty limitation and permitting the FLSA extension.
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 457 U.S. 1101 (1982), vacating
25 W & H Cases 274 (W.D. Tex.); accord Dove v. Chattanooga Regional Transp.
Auth., 701 F.2d 50, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1983); Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, 699
F.2d 1060, 1069 (11th Cir. 1983); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677
F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1982). But see San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v.
Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (on remand from Supreme Court,
declining to read United Transp. Union as a bar to mass transit's immunity from
FLSA). This validates the federal power to effect mass transit regulation through use
of a condition. Cf. City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1217-18 (M.D.
Ga. 1977)(no violation of tenth amendment because participation in assistance program is voluntary).
286. This issue is often framed as a measuring of the free will of the grant recipient
in accepting the terms of the condition. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 21 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479
(1980)(Burger, C.J.); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-90 (1936). Free
acceptance of a condition will be inferred when a state or one of its political
subdivisions accepts aid to which Congress has attached a condition that is set forth
unambiguously. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. Free will is irrelevant, however. If the
desired effect of the condition is within federal power, there need not be any consent.
If it is ultra vires, no acquiescence can authorize it. Only through the vehicle of the
Constitution may the states delegate power to the federal government.
287. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565-66, 574 (1911). Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 597 (1936) (states may contract in any manner with Congress so long as
the "essence of statehood" is "maintained without impairment").
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B. Federal Self-Restraint
The impotence of legal formulae for limiting federal power mandates a second approach. Reliance must be placed upon appeals to
federal legislative and executive self-restraint. 2 8 This is certainly neither hopeless nor useless. Those who hold power must be conscious of
its nature, uses and effects.2 89 As part of the governing republic, the
courts must perform their role in a manner that encourages appropriate self-restraint. They must draw the attention of legislative and
executive actors to publicism and federalism issues.
C. The Current Judicial Approach: Imposition
Just as there are two mechanisms available for judicial limitation of
federal power, there are two means by which the courts may effectuate federal self-restraint. The recent judicial response to section 13(c)
is one of these. 290 This approach is misguided, however, for it imposes
self-restraint. In fact, it relies on judicial supersession of the democratic process.
1. Massachusetts and Jackson Transit Authority
The case law evidences a thwarting of legislative will. In Local
Division 589, A TU v. Massachusetts,29 1 the First Circuit relies on five
points it finds in legislative history and the character of the statute to
hold that subsequent inconsistent state enactments may override the
provisions of an existent section 13(c) agreement. 292 Each of the court's
conclusions is a questionable interpretation of the legislative action.
Any congressional recognition of the local character of public transportation is contravened by the fact that the federal government
nonetheless intervened. Federal involvement in the form of monetary
assistance, with the inevitable accompaniment of conditions, necessarily affects the local character of the relevant activity through the

288. See, e.g., Wallick & Montalto, Symbiosis or Domination: Rights and Renedies Under Grant-Type Assistance Programs, 46 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 172
(1978). Implicit acknowledgment is seen in proposals such as the transit-corporation
model, where policy arguments are employed in an effort to influence legislative and
executive actors. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, passim. But cf. Note,
Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1871, 1885 (1976) (need exists for judicial resolution of federalism conflicts).
289. See, e.g., supra note 116.
290. See supra notes 123-31, 147-87 and accompanying text.
291. 666 F.2d 618 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982).
292. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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introduction of regulatory requirements and the involvement of national interest groups. 29 3 Congressional focus on the protection of
workers involved in public takeovers does suggest a transitional role
for section 13(c), yet its continued existence without limitation
through substantial changes in urban mass-transit intervention indicates more permanence. 29 4 The need to preserve the Secretary of
Labor's discretion assumes a post-certification role that is not at all
obvious from the statute or the legislative history. Finally, there is
simply too much equivocation in the legislative history to permit an
inference that any particular enforcement mechanism was intended or
even considered.295
The problems with the recent judicial response to section 13(c) are
also evident in Jackson Transit Authority.2 96 The case is marred by
strained reliance on legislative history. Congress was inexplicit in its
perceptions of the long-term operation of section 13(c). Moreover, the
general direction ascertainable from the congressional deliberations is
misinterpreted by the Court.2 97 It is not absolutely clear whether
Congress intended to create a body of federal law applicable to local

293. Cf. VANHORN, supra note 147, at 3 (state and local governments being
viewed as conduits through which national goals may be accomplished).
294. Section 13(c)'s impact was dramatically increased by the provision of operating subsidies beginning in 1974. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 314-15, 317 (statement of
Willard Wirtz); 1963 House Hearings, supra note 75, at 481-82 (statement of Willard
Wirtz); S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1963); 109 CONG. REC. 5416-18,
5422 (1963).
296. 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
297. It must be noted that Jackson is one of a series of cases in which the Supreme
Court has limited the implication of private rights of action in federal statutes. See,
e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 767-69 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1979). This trend represents a distinct policy perspective of the
Court. See generally Hazen, Implied Private Remedies under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulations, and
Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of
Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1978);
Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization Within
the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DuKE L.J. 928; Comment, The Implication Doctrine
After Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied Causes of Action in
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 26 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1981); Note, Implied Private
Rights of Action Under Federal Statutes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Deference,
or Mutual Abdication? 50 FORnHAM L. REV. 611 (1982); Note, Implied Private
Actions Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 429 (1976).
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governmental transit labor relations.2 98 The background of section
13(c) shows that Congress intended "voluntary" state compliance with
the principle it was enacting. A federalization of labor relations in the
manner of the Railway Labor Act 299 was thus clearly not effected.
This nevertheless does not define the parameters of federal involvement in the arrangements made pursuant to section 13(c).
2. Options Under Section 13(c)
a. Reliance on Executive Remedies
The parameters of federal involvement may be found only through
a logical analysis of the process created by section 13(c). A key question is the nature of the avenues of relief available to a union within
the executive branch. Jackson and its predecessors 0 0 give only tangential consideration to the question of post-certification federal administrative involvement. The Supreme Court stated it was expressing no
view on the ability of the federal government to sue a grant recipient
in federal court for a violation of section 13(c), because this would
involve the grant contract and the contract between the recipient and
the union. 30 The Sixth Circuit dismissed a mandamus action to compel a determination by the Secretaries of Labor and Transportation
that the transit authority was in breach of its section 13(c) obligations.
It held such an administrative action could not be compelled. 30 2 The
First Circuit stated that the Secretary of Transportation could bring a
federal suit for enforcement because the terms are contained in the
grant contract. 30 3 It further called it "plausible" that an Administrative Procedure Act 30 4 remedy exists for forcing action by the federal
officials. 30 5 The Eleventh Circuit advanced the middle ground that
30 6
the Secretaries have the authority but not the duty to act.

298. Contra 457 U.S. at 26-28.

299. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
300. See supra notes 126, 136, 138-42, 152 and accompanying text.
301. 457 U.S. 15, 29 n.13 (1982).
302. Local Div. 285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379, 1388 (6th Cir.

1981).
303. Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1, 13 (1st
Cir. 1978). Accord Division 587, ATU v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663
F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1981).

304. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-58, 701-06 (1976).
305. 589 F.2d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1978).
306. Local Div. 732, ATU v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d
1327, 1339 n.26 (11th Cir. 1982).
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The factual contexts within which these cases arise indicate the
infeasibility of federal administrative action. The procedure enacted
by section 13(c) and implemented by the Departments of Labor and
Transportation is activated only at the moment of an application for
financial assistance. The suits by the unions arise long after the underlying grant is made.3 °7 To rely on agency policing of the numerous
section 13(c) arrangements presently in effect is to vitiate the statutory
guarantee.
b. Judicial Pressure on Executive Actors
An alternative that would scale this information barrier would be to
rely on mandamus-type actions to compel some sort of action on the
grant contract.3 08 This is thoroughly problematic, however. The actions
contemplated would be within the purview of the Secretary of Transportation, but the obvious intent of Congress was to lodge the workerprotective function in the chief federal labor official.30 9 The sanction of
fund withdrawal is of questionable value because the intended beneficiaries would be harmed as much as or even more than the alleged
offenders.3 10 If a contract enforcement suit is envisioned, it would entail
a circuity that is both harmful and unnecessary. The relevant agreement is clearly segregated in the contract between the recipient and the
union. After certification, it involves nothing requiring the special

307. In the MARTA case, the agreement was entered into on February 14, 1977,
and the union's suit upon it was filed on June 29, 1981. Id. at 1329-30. The Secretary
of Labor approved the LaCrosse § 13(c) agreement on May 1, 1974, and the suit was
brought in July, 1977. Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util., 585
F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1978). The original agreement in Jackson, Tennessee
was certified in 1966, and it was not until 1975 that the controversy arose that
necessitated legal action upon it. Local Div. 1285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth.,
650 F.2d 1379, 1381 (6th Cir. 1981).
308. The union in Jackson asked the court to order the Secretary of Transportation
"to take 'appropriate action to enforce compliance.' " Local Div. 1285, ATU v.
Jackson Transit Auth., 447 F. Supp. 88, 91 (1981). The district court could not find
any congressional intent to make the Secretary a continuing monitor of compliance
with § 13(c) agreements and refused to issue a mandamus. Id. at 91-92.
309. See 110 CONG. REC. 15,453 (1964). Cf. Local Div 1258, ATU v. Jackson
Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379, 1388 (6th Cir. 1981) (unreasonable to imply that
Secretary of Transportation has responsibility for labor policy).
310. See, e.g., Reagan, Accountability and Independence in Federal Grants-inAid, in THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY; THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 206
(B.L.R. Smith ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC USE]; Mansfield, Independence
and Accountability for Federal Contractors and Grantees, in PUBLIC USE, supra, at
333.
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expertise of the Secretary of Transportation. Legal action is more easily
31
instituted by the original parties to the contract. 1
c. Traditional Judicial Remedies
The reductionist approach employed by the Eleventh Circuit,
312
which regards these cases merely as common law contract disputes
thus has merit insofar as it captures the essential judicial character of
the post-certification federal role. The specific language of section
13(c) should be seen as an initiator. Once the arrangements it mandates have been developed and certified, section 13(c) is replaced by
31 3
the arrangements for that grant to that system.
The expertise and discretion 31 4 of the Secretary of Labor upon
which the section relies is fully utilized. No other benefit can be
obtained from section 13(c) and its role is fulfilled. The contract
embodying the arrangements becomes the vehicle for ensuring that no
employee is harmed as a result of federal aid. 31 5 This contract will be
geared to the particularities of the grant, the recipient, and the work-

311. See Division 587, ATU v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d
875, 878 (9th Cir. 1981); Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland, 589 F.2d 1, 15
(1st Cir. 1978); Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util., 445 F. Supp.
798, 811 (W.D. Wis. 1978). One of the factors leading to this conclusion is the
volume of § 13(c) paperwork that must be handled by the Department of Labor in
the absence of any continuing enforcement duties. For example, over 1,000 certification requests were expected in fiscal year 1980 (only 612 of which were to be closed,
in the Department's own estimation). Supplemental AppropriationBill, 1980: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., Part 4, 555 (1980) (statement presented by Labor-Management Services Administration).
312. Local Div. 732, ATU v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d
1327, 1332-33 (l1th Cir. 1982).
313. See Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland Transit Auth., 589 F.2d 1, 1112 (1st Cir. 1978).
314. See Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968); City of Macon v.
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1218-24 (M.D. Ga. 1977); cf. Congress of Ry. Unions
v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1971) (in the context of similar statutory
language, finding limited, if any, judicial review of Secretary of Labor determination of "fair and equitable arrangements" in connection with Amtrak's labor agreements).
315. Although there is indeed no requirement in the statute for such a contract,
see Local Div. 732, ATU v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d
1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982), it is reasonable to infer it, considering the contemplation
of local negotiations and the existing contractual relationship under the NLRA
framework. See Division 587, ATU v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d
875, 878 (9th Cir. 1981); Local Div. 1285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d
1379, 1385 (6th Cir. 1981); Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util.,
445 F. Supp. 798, 820 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
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ers. Certification will have established its peculiar equity and suitability.3 16 Because the interpretation and enforcement of contracts are
regular judicial activities, the courts have a special aptitude for the
317
post-certification tasks.
d. The Federal Courts
Section 13(c) agreements are not mere common law contracts, however. Contracts for the purpose of ensuring protection of employee
rights in the context of federal financial assistance were nonexistent at
common law. Their existence results from section 13(c).3 1 8 They are
the means by which the statutory objective becomes operational. 31 " To
breach these contracts must be to breach the statute.3 20 Consequently,
the agreements and section 13(c) are so intertwined that contractual
interpretation necessarily involves issues of federal statutory construc3 22
tion. 3 21 This is a uniquely federal task.
A federal judicial role is inherent in the process created by section
13(c); it is the sole technique for ensuring labor protection. This role
may be realized only if unions are given a federal cause of action to
enforce section 13(c) arrangements. The judgement in Jackson is,
therefore, inconsistent with congressional intent and purpose.
3. The Model of Judicial Imposition
The recent response of the courts to section 13(c) represented in
Massachusetts and Jackson Transit Authority represents judiciallyimposed federal self-restraint. After the legislative branch has acted,

316. This exposes an error in the analysis of Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse
Mun. Transit Util., 445 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Wis. 1978), where the court found two
of three claims presented by the union's complaint to be whether federal law required the agreement and if it further required the particular provisions of the
agreement involved there. Id. at 805. These issues are obviated by certification.
317. See id. at 812.
318. See Division 587, ATU v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d
875, 878 (9th Cir. 1981).
319. See Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1, 15
(1st Cir. 1978); Local Div. 1285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379, 1385
(6th Cir. 1981); Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util., 445 F. Supp.
at 817.
320. Local Div. 1285, ATU v. Jackson Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379, 1392 (6th
Cir. 1981).
321. See Local Div. 519, ATU v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Auth., 585 F.2d 1340,
1346 (7th Cir. 1978).
322. See Local Div. 714, ATU v. Greater Portland Transit Auth., 589 F.2d 1, 13
(1st Cir. 1978).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XII

323
judges intervene to curtail the resulting reaches of federal power.
Unless Congress is explicit in intending otherwise, conditions on the
receipt of federal funds are given limited effect after fulfillment of
their initial purpose. In the context of section 13(c), the role of the
legislative enactment is to require the negotiation of protective arrangements that are reviewed and approved by the Department of
Labor. Once this approval is given and the grant is made, no further
federal labor protection role of any type arises under the provision.
This approach enables the judiciary to allow the use of conditions as a
prerogative associated with the spending power yet to also limit the
conditions' intrusive reach through the exercise of the judicial powers.
The basic problem with this approach is its legitimation of a broad
policy-making role for the judiciary. This role is inconsistent with
basic precepts of our socio-political system.3 24 Any call for a more
"sensible" public policy illuminates the fundamental conflict between
democracy and efficiency. Collective decision making lacks clear and
consistent direction, and it often borders on abject irrationality. 32 In
response, more technocratic approaches to policy making are advocated, such as the transit-corporation model and the brokerage concept. The goal of these approaches is to perform governmental tasks in

323. Jackson and Massachusetts may be seen as examples of one model for the
judicial role in addressing the question of federal self-restraint. Each case uses the
power of the courts to limit the legislative and executive branches and thus closely
circumscribe the effective federal activity. Underlying each must be a perception of
the pervasiveness of § 13(c) and maybe even a sense that the provision is a monster of
sorts, abandoned by its creators and exploited by its benefactors. This looks like
policy elaboration, not the clearly sinful policy substitution of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). Jackson cuts off an avenue of exploitation and goes on to deny
any special protective aura to the § 13(c) arrangements. Massachusetts gives leeway
to states that want to take affirmative action and impose order on the crazed system.
The close attention to legislative history in each case may show a further concern
with the depth of support for labor's demands. The courts may be utilizing a
common sense approach that discounts provisions added only to meet the extraneous
demands of a temporarily significant voting bloc.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Mendelson, The Case for Judicial Restraint, in BAsIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123-31 (S.Hendel 8th ed. 1976).
325. HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 2 ("[i]t appears that American
politics has shaped government enterprise haphazardly to fit specific practical problems or perchance simply to reach an end without much regard to the means ...");
PIKARSKY & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 77-78 (policy development in urban mass
transit has been characterized by occurrence of changes primarily during times of
stress or crisis, application of existing policies to greatly changed situations, and
ignoring of model interaction through independent treatment).
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a more efficient or "business-like" environment. 326 The core effect is to
shift from popular decision making to an arrangement in which decisions are made outside of the established republican system. 327 The
judicial approach taken in Massachusetts and Jackson Transit Authority contains this element and suffers from its illegitimacy.
D. A New Judicial Approach: Encouragement
Another model for judicial action, in which this is recognized, must

be developed. The appropriate level of federal self-restraint in our
system of government cannot be periodically divined by the courts.
Though it may be trite, the only legitimate response to the problems of

a democratic system is more democracy. The judiciary must encourage this response.
A first step would be to give extraneous conditions their fullest
effect. This approach forces Congress to realize its full responsibility
for legislative policy. If conditions on federal aid are excessive, this
will then become apparent. The role of the judiciary must be to
effectuate the costs and benefits of legitimately made policy judgments, not to interpose judicial values. In the process, one of the
effects of conditions may be the potentially intrusive involvement of
the federal courts in state and local affairs. If this and other results are
undesirable and constitute bad law, that must become apparent to
Congress. As long as the legislative action that is the cause is within
the confines of the Constitution, 32 8 there is no restraint to place upon
it. It is not the judicial role to save the system from itself. 329
326. See, e.g.,.HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 52, 79-83, 98-103.
327. What occurs is a delegation of power unaccompanied by means of reciprocal
control. Although the Hamiltons maintain that proper structuring enables a delegation to relatively autonomous businesses (with the achievement of efficiency) to
coexist with political accountability, see id. at 79-114, there is an unavoidable and
real conflict between the vesting of public functions in these entities and the preservation of responsiveness to the citizenry and its institutions. Colcord, Public Transitand
Institutional Change, in PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND
MANAGEMENT 587 (G.Gray & L. Hoel ed. 1979).
328. A good corollary to this model is to prohibit judicial intervention regarding
federalistic questions of federal power, relying on the political system to monitor the
ordering of affairs along federal/state lines as it does along public/private lines. See
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); cf. REAGAN & SANZONE, supra note 256,
at 157 (states and localities have sufficient political strength at the national level to
protect themselves); Wechsler, supra note 243, at 558-60 (Congress has ultimate
authority for managing federalism); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 247, at
1186-87 (noting absence of political safeguards of federalism in judiciary, in context
of § 1983 suits). But see Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, COLUM. L. REV. 847, 858-68 (1979) (political safeguards of federalism are no
longer reliable).
329. The judicial rule of deferential enforcement confronts a dilemma when
executive branch conduct thwarts the apparent legislative purpose. The recognition
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VIII. Conclusion
The current state of federalism-federal government dominance,
most audaciously evidenced in the use of extraneous conditions on the
receipt of federal funds-emanates from the necessities of such a
governmental structure. The powers essential to a central government
do not have inherent self-limitations and it is folly to attempt to

of the full breadth of federal power that accompanied the reconciliation of constitutional doctrine with social reality, see supra note 324 and accompanying text, also
legitimized the modern administrative state and its broad delegations of policy
making authority to non-legislative entities. The executive, therefore, does not suffer
the disability of the judiciary. The courts' role as intermediary, forced upon it by the
citizens affected by the relevant actions, is problematic.
This problem has surfaced in relation to § 13(c) and may be seen in ATU v.
Donovan, 554 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1982). See supra note 252. The underlying
dispute in that case is the Secretary of Labor's utilization of the discretion given to
him by the statute (to determine "fair and equitable arrangements") to eliminate the
now traditional provision for binding interest arbitration procedures in projects
funded by UMTA grants. See 554 F. Supp. at 592, 593 n.6, 598. As seen above, the
discretion bestowed by § 13(c) is broad and the authority reposed in the Secretary
great. It may well be that the Secretary, in his expert judgment, saw the problems
perceived by the courts and decided that absence of the usual impasse resolution
procedures was not necessary to the existence of fair and equitable arrangements. In
this light, the executive action is due to the deference Congress itself provided for in
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the court's decision was entirely proper. On
the other hand, our political system does not equate delegation with the power to
eviscerate the delegator's intent. As the union pointed out in this case, the delegation
to the Secretary of Labor is not standardless, for five guarantees are specified, id. at
592-93, 597. Furthermore, collective bargaining rights are illusory without legally
binding impasse resolution procedures. BARNUM, supra note 58, at 77. Considering
the political predispositions of the present administration, it is hard not to question
the true concern with the fairness and equity of the conditionally certified arrangements to the workers involved. At the same time, the tenets of a checked and
balanced republican system necessarily allow for some kind of variation among the
branches. An accommodation consistent with constitutional precepts must be fashioned. As part of the new model being advocated here, the best approach may be a
revival of the constitutional nondelegation doctrine to ensure legislative direction of
policy making. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81
YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972). But see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1693-97 (1975) (recognizing possible
utility of a policy of narrow construction of statutory delegations but characterizing a
revival of the nondelegation doctrine as unwise). See generally A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935). In lieu of this, the courts must be extremely sensitive to
legislative intent and the parameters of discretion enacted. The strained interpretation of legislative history employed in this case-implying positive disapproval by
Congress in its non-adoption of certain language in the unions' proposal for what
became § 13(c), see ATU v. Donovan, 554 F. Supp. 589, 597-98 (D.D.C. 1982)does not evidence appropriate sensitivity.
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rationally discern any. The nature of the extraneous conditions that
represent the extent of federal power may be seen in section 13(c) of
the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Both its genesis and
implementation show the ramifications of federal power. They point
to the need for at least an awareness of the problems associated with
unbridled federal activity. Recognizing this explicitly and implicitly
acknowledging the fact that self-restraint is the only limit on the
central government, the federal courts have circumscribed section
13(c). This is an illegitimate use of the judicial power, however. It is
the policy makers themselves who must exercise restraint, and it is to
them that we must now turn.

